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Abstract 
This dissertation is a collection of three essays that investigate the role and importance of 
discretionary disclosures by managers, stock price comovement and government 
intervention into financial markets during a financial crisis. Chapter 1 explores the 
governance implications on a firm’s information environment in the context of 
discretionary hedging disclosures made by oil and gas companies from 1991 to 2013. 
Firms with poor governance relative to industry peers are more likely to voluntarily 
disclose hedging changes and do so more frequently. My findings indicate that 
discretionary disclosures and governance are substitutes as firms increase their 
transparency to offset relatively poor governance based on traditional measures of 
corporate governance. I also provide evidence that poorly (well) governed firms with high 
institutional ownership are more (less) likely to increase the transparency of their hedging 
policy changes through discretionary disclosures. 
Chapter 2 investigates how a firm’s dividend initiation announcement (positive news) 
influences stock prices of seemingly unrelated firms within the same metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA). After accounting for firm, industry, and geographic 
characteristics, dividend paying firms located in areas with a higher percentage of 
dividend clientele experience a positive comovement reaction when a seemingly 
unrelated firm within the same MSA announces a dividend initiation. The positive 
reactions are specifically for dividend paying firms, while non-dividend payers exhibit 
no significant response. These results are robust to numerous regression methods and 
alternative explanations. Collectively, these findings are consistent with the positive-
xi 
investor attention hypothesis, suggesting positive spillover effects from news 
announcements for other local firms in the presence of individual investor clientele. 
Chapter 3 examines the effects of government guaranteed bank bonds. We find 
guaranteed bank bonds vastly improve debt liquidity, default risk, and significantly 
reduce the cost of debt for less liquid, more risky, and shorter-term bond issuances. 
Greater benefits for riskier and shorter-term bonds are related to the positive term 
structure of the government insurance premia combined with a negative term structure of 
credit spreads for weaker banks. These results are consistent with extant theory 
concerning the financial accelerator, credit spread term structures, and default-liquidity 
loops. 
 
1 
Chapter 1: 
Discretionary Hedging Disclosures and Corporate Governance 
 
I. Introduction 
Publicly traded firms are exposed to the classical principal-agent dilemma arising 
from the separation of ownership and management of the firm. Shareholders employ 
managers with the objective of maximizing shareholder wealth; however, managerial and 
shareholder goals do not always align. Consequently, shareholders implement various 
corporate governance mechanisms to help facilitate the maximization of firm value, 
including various measures pertaining to the composition of the board, types of 
ownership, and shareholder rights provisions.1  
Beyond the principal-agent problem, managers possess an informational 
advantage over outside shareholders with respect to the value of the firm and its future 
prospects. Managers then disclose information at their discretion. Accordingly, investors 
rationally expect these disclosures by management.2 Managers must assess the additional 
costs and benefits associated with improving the firm’s transparency to develop an 
optimal level of disclosure.3 The benefits of increased transparency include reduced 
                                                 
1 For example, see the following: Outside Directors – Weisbach (1988); Byrd and Hickman (1992); 
Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994). Board Size - Lipton and Lorsch (1992); Jensen (1993); Yermack (1996); 
Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998); and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008). Types of ownership – 
Hartzell and Starks (2003); Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003); Chen, Harford, and Li (2007); and Edmans 
(2009). Provisions - Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2001); Cremers and Nair (2005); and Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Ferrell (2009).  
2 Aboody and Kasznik (2000) show that managers time voluntary disclosures and stock option awards. 
Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal (2011) find evidence that managers purposefully discontinue earnings 
guidance. Ahern and Sosyura (2014) show that managers publicly disclose more information following the 
onset of merger negotiations and prior to the public announcement. 
3 Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) are one of the first to model the cost-benefit tradeoff of voluntary 
disclosure. 
2 
information asymmetry, greater stock liquidity, and a lower cost of equity capital.4 The 
costs of increased transparency involve making the disclosure and revealing proprietary 
information to the market and competitors.5  
However, the important question of how the information released through 
discretionary disclosure interacts with a firm’s governance quality has not been resolved. 
Relatively better governed firms may have increased disclosure practices. This greater 
transparency could be due to either increased monitoring (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 
2005; Karamanou and Vafeas 2005) or through compensation incentives for managers 
(Hui and Matsunaga 2015). Conversely, better governed firms may have less need for 
improved transparency due to greater monitoring, whereas poorly governed companies 
might increase disclosure to mitigate the potential costs of the lack of transparency.6 I 
address the important question of whether corporate governance and information 
transparency are complements or substitutes by studying the discretionary hedging 
disclosures made by oil and gas companies from 1991 to 2013. 
The use of hedging activities is prevalent throughout the U.S. corporate sector. 
However, the risk management literature has failed to establish whether hedging creates 
shareholder value.7 Hedging decisions induce agency concerns between debtholders and 
equity holders as shareholders have the incentive to unwind existing hedging positions 
                                                 
4 See the following: Amihud and Mendelson (1989), Botosan (1997), Botosan and Harris (2000), Leuz and 
Verrrecchia (2000), Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang (2011), Balakrishnan et. al (2014), and others.  
5 See Verrecchia and Weber (2006) among others. 
6 For a thorough review of the entire voluntary disclosure literature, please see Healy and Palepu (2001) 
and Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010). 
7 Many studies have found a positive relationship between hedging and firm value, including Allayannis 
and Weston (2001), Chidambaran, Fernando, and Spindt (2001), Haushalter, Heron, and Lie (2002), Adam 
and Fernando (2006), MacKay and Moeller (2007), Pérez-González and Yun (2013), and Gilje and Taillard 
(2015). In contrast, Guay, and Kothari (2003) contend hedging is not economically meaningful, while Jin 
and Jorion (2006) fail to find any significant effect of hedging on shareholder value.  
3 
following debt financing, which raises doubts about the credibility of the hedge (Smith 
and Stulz 1985). Financial engineering solutions to address this credibility issue are 
available by bundling the hedge and financing into a single hybrid debt security, making 
the hedge uneconomical to unwind prior to the debt being repaid (Chidambaran, 
Fernando, and Spindt 2001). Unfortunately, this cumbersome approach diminishes the 
firm’s flexibility to respond to changes in production and market conditions. An 
alternative approach to establish credibility, especially in poorly governed firms with high 
agency costs, is through building a reputation for enhanced disclosure (Beyer and Dye 
2012). Consequently, one would expect to observe an inverse relation between 
governance and the level of discretionary disclosure. 
Companies are required to disclose their oil and gas hedging activities in their 
annual SEC 10-K filings. Announcements such as earnings, dividends, and stock splits 
are considered material to shareholder value and obligate firms to disclose such 
information in a timely manner. However, changes in hedging activities are not viewed 
as such, and the voluntary disclosure of these activities prior to the release of the SEC 
filings is subject to managerial discretion.8 In my sample, some firms voluntarily disclose 
their hedging transactions, others only provide this information through mandatory 
annual filings, and the remainder do not have any hedging positions. Examining the 
systematic differences across these various types of oil and gas companies offers 
considerable potential to empirically identify the impact governance has on discretionary 
disclosure practices.  
                                                 
8 Nonetheless, Raman, Fernando, and Hoelscher (2015) show that hedging increase (decrease) 
announcements cause economically and statistically significant negative (positive) reactions in equity 
prices for both the announcing firm and industry in a sample of gold mining firms. I find similar results in 
my sample for hedging decrease announcements. 
4 
The discretionary disclosure literature has yet to arrive at a consensus on the 
economic definition for discretionary disclosure.9 I hand-collect a sample of 490 
discretionary announcements relating to changes in hedging policies made by oil and gas 
firms between January 1991 and January 2013 as a measure of disclosure. To the best of 
my knowledge, this is a novel measure of discretionary disclosure that has yet to be 
examined in the literature. The discretionary hedging announcements allow me to create 
four distinct measures of discretionary disclosure: (a) an indicator variable for disclosure, 
(b) a count variable for the number of disclosures, (c) a ratio of the number of 
announcements relative to the number of industry announcements, and (d) a transparency 
measure that incorporates the count of disclosures and the time series standard deviation 
of its hedge ratio. First, I use a panel regression to investigate the impact of corporate 
governance on discretionary disclosure practices. Second, to address and minimize 
sample selection bias and endogeneity, I use a Heckman (1979) two-step selection 
approach. This empirical framework along with the four previously described measures 
allow for the assurance that any results are not dependent upon the selected measure of 
discretionary disclosure. 
I employ the G-Index (governance index) created by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2001), the ATI (alternative takeover provision index) used by Cremers and Nair (2005), 
and the E-Index (entrenchment index) from Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) as 
measures of corporate governance in deferring takeovers. Karpoff, Schonlau, and Wehrly 
                                                 
9 These measures include the now-discontinued AIMR scores, indices based upon researcher judgement of 
financial disclosures, language processing technologies, and measures contrived from reported earnings. 
These measures are prone to researcher bias and are often a combination of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure. Recently, the literature has focused on management forecasts and conference calls, which are 
voluntary. 
5 
(2015) provide empirical support that the G-Index and E-Index are viable measures for 
takeover deterrence after controlling for endogeneity. I find evidence that governance and 
discretionary disclosure are substitutes as firms with higher G-Index and E-Index scores 
(i.e., weaker governance) are not only more likely to voluntarily disclose hedging 
announcements but also to issue more announcements. Results for the E-Index tend to be 
the strongest and most robust. This finding is consistent with the conjecture by Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) that some shareholder provisions are more important than 
others. I control for other characteristics that the literature has shown are related to a 
firm’s disclosure policy such as financial analyst coverage, forecast dispersion, board 
independence, board size, and return volatility.10 These measures tend to affect 
discretionary disclosure, but most consistently firms with greater analyst coverage are 
more likely to make discretionary announcements. The lack of support for the ATI 
confirms that there is a differential effect between provisions. 
Investing in an oil and gas company is often regarded as a substitute for investing 
directly in oil and gas. Tufano (1998) shows that changes in hedging alter the stock price 
exposure of these firms to the price of oil and gas. Investors take into consideration a 
firm’s hedging policies and differentiate between firms based upon their exposure to oil 
and gas prices. Consequently, investors, especially large institutional investors, will want 
to know if the firm changes its hedging policy. Accordingly, I find evidence that 
institutional ownership has a positive relationship with discretionary disclosure.11 This 
                                                 
10 Please see Ajinkya and Gift (1984), Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005), Hutton (2005), and 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), among others. 
11 This is consistent with Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) and Bushee and Noe (2000). 
6 
finding indicates that institutional investors may influence the level of a firm’s 
discretionary disclosure. 
A potential concern is that a firm’s initial disclosure is correlated with a change 
in corporate governance. In other words, an alternate explanation for my finding that the 
quality of governance and level of discretionary disclosure are substitutes is that, once a 
firm begins disclosure, they experience a subsequent change in governance and I am 
simply documenting the relationship. However, I find no evidence of a significant relation 
between a firm’s decision to voluntarily disclose changes in hedging and a subsequent 
change in the governance of the firm. 
The results that firms with a higher E-Index are more likely to disclose allows for 
the opportunity to empirically investigate which provisions might be driving the 
discretionary disclosure. I find that firms with provisions that limit shareholders’ ability 
to amend bylaws, which require a super majority to approve a merger deal, and that have 
severance agreements for the management and board (i.e., golden parachutes) are more 
likely to provide discretionary disclosures. There is marginal evidence that firms that limit 
the ability to amend the corporate charter are less likely to disclose. Surprisingly, 
staggered boards do not appear to be associated with the disclosure policy of the firms; 
this evidence is consistent with the lack of results for the ATI measure, as that is the only 
overlapping provision.  
Collectively, I find that governance and discretionary disclosure are substitutes, 
and that institutional ownership positively impacts the disclosure environment of the firm. 
The reason why firms with poor governance might actually increase transparency is 
relevant. Theory argues that relatively poorly governed firms would voluntarily disclose 
7 
changes in hedging as the perceived cost of withholding the information is greater than 
the benefit from not disclosing (Hermalin and Weisbach 2007). Empirically, I find that 
firms with lower (higher) E-Index values are less (more) likely to disclose announcements 
when the firm has high institutional holdings. Institutional shareholders’ impact on a 
firm’s disclosure policy is differential based upon on the corporate governance of the 
firm. 
This study contributes to the discretionary disclosure literature by providing 
evidence on the link between governance and determinants of disclosure. I provide a new 
perspective on this topic by undertaking an analysis of hedging behavior by oil and gas 
firms using discretionary hedging announcements as a research context. In studying firms 
with a homogenous exposure to market risks, I document a consistent link between the 
level of corporate governance and discretionary disclosure. Institutional ownership plays 
a pivotal role in the information environment of a firm. The results suggest the interaction 
between shareholder provisions and institutional ownership have ramifications on 
disclosure policies. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the 
relevant literature and develops testable hypotheses; Section III details the sample, 
variables, and research design; Section IV presents and discusses empirical findings; and 
finally, Section V provides concluding comments.  
 
II. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
A firm’s disclosure environment is influenced by managers’ perceived costs and 
benefits of increasing or decreasing disclosure to derive the optimal level for the firm. 
8 
Too little or too much disclosure could hurt the firm’s value (Hermalin and Weisbach 
2007). Improved disclosure can reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders, leading to a lower cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Botosan 
1997; and Botosan and Plumlee 2005). The risk of litigation due to the lack of 
transparency can motivate managers to increase disclosure and lead to lower settlement 
costs (Skinner 1994; Skinner 1997; Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther 2000). Managers 
also have the ability to influence their reputation through disclosure choices (Tucker 
2007; Beyer and Dye 2012).  
Two principles help motivate the idea that voluntary disclosure and corporate 
governance are complements. First, as managers become more entrenched, their 
incentives to improve transparency can be reduced (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; 
Ferreira and Laux 2007). Second, managers with less insulation from market discipline 
may have greater incentive to improve transparency. Doing so aligns their objectives with 
shareholder goals as they have greater exposure to market discipline and are at greater 
risk of being replaced or taken over (Ambrose and Megginson 1992). Therefore, I 
hypothesize that corporate governance and voluntary disclosure act as complements as 
oil and gas companies with stronger shareholder protection are more likely to voluntarily 
disclose.  
There is considerable empirical evidence that suggests disclosure and governance 
act as complements. Bens (2002) finds a positive relationship between disclosure and 
shareholder monitoring. A country’s judicial regime also influences firm transparency 
(Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2004) as well as ownership concentration and the 
informativeness of company disclosure (Fan and Wong 2002). Dual class share 
9 
companies have lower earnings informativeness compared to single class shares (Francis, 
Schipper, and Vincent 2005). Governance associated with board structure is positively 
associated with voluntary disclosure (Ajinkya, Bhorjraj, and Sengupta 2005; Karamanou 
and Vafeas 2005). Lastly, Hope and Thomas (2008) find that companies with substantial 
foreign operations that disclose geographical earnings outperform their non-disclosure 
counterparts.  
However, increasing discretionary disclosure is costly, not only in terms of 
resources, but also in terms of revealing proprietary information about the firm 
(Jovanovic 1982; Verrrecchia 1983). Managers that are exposed to a greater threat of 
takeover might intentionally reduce firm transparency to deter the potential for a takeover, 
essentially creating their own “anti-takeover” provision. Greater opaqueness of a firm’s 
financial situation has the ability to reduce takeover probabilities (Shleifer and Vishny 
1989; Edlin and Stiglitz 1995). Therefore, an alternative hypothesis is that corporate 
governance and discretionary disclosure are substitutes, and oil and gas companies with 
weaker shareholder protection are more likely to provide voluntary disclosure. 
The hypothesis that disclosure and governance are substitutes also finds support 
in the literature. Companies with greater financial analyst coverage are less likely to hold 
open conference calls (Tasker 1998; Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller 2003). Family firms 
can be more susceptible to governance issues. However, family firms tend to provide not 
only higher quality earnings announcements (Ali, Chen, and Radharishnan 2007), but 
also more transparent earning warnings (Chen, Chen, and Cheng 2008). Armstrong, 
Balakrishnan, and Cohen (2012) study the informativeness of financial disclosures and 
find evidence that financial transparency (i.e., mandatory disclosure) increases when a 
10 
state adopts an antitakeover law. Finally, Zhao, Allen, and Hasan (2013) investigate state 
antitakeover laws and disclosure using the AIMR ratings and find evidence that firms in 
states with greater takeover protection have higher ratings. Unfortunately, the AIMR data 
is only available through 1995 and is a measure created by analysts that incorporates both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Thus, the extant literature also provides support for 
the substitute hypothesis. Therefore in sum, the collective body of literature on the topic 
is divided on the question of whether disclosure and governance are complements or 
substitutes. 
 
III. Sample and Research Design 
i. Sample and Data 
Utilizing a Factiva guided search, I hand-collect oil and gas firm public 
disclosures related to changes in hedging policies.12 The announcement sample period 
spans between January 1991 and January 2013. Disclosures include hedging program 
initiations, closures, and changes. I identify the sample as companies that are classified 
by Compustat as being in the oil and natural gas industry (SIC=1311), that are linked 
between CRSP and Compustat, and that have total assets greater than zero reported by 
Compustat. These constraints result in an initial sample of 103 oil and gas firms disclosing 
490 changes in hedging policy announcements. The remaining oil and gas firms, to the 
best of my knowledge, do not voluntarily disclose any changes to hedging policies.  
More stringent disclosure and accounting regulations were enacted between 1999 
and 2001, which affect the sample period. One example is the Statement of Financial 
                                                 
12 I include numerous sources such as Business Wire, Dow-Jones Newswires, PR Newswires, Reuters news, 
The Wall Street Journal, among other Major English Dailies in the United States. 
11 
Accounting Standards No. 133 (SFAS 133). These regulations provide shareholders with 
greater transparency regarding corporate risk management practices, specifically the use 
of derivative instruments. Unsurprisingly, there are more announcements in the post-2000 
period. The sample consists of considerably more hedging disclosures pertaining to 
increases (n=471) than decreases (n=19). Figure 1 provides a visual timeline of the 
hedging announcements along with natural gas and oil commodity prices. 
[Place Figure 1 about here] 
Beyond collecting the disclosure date, direction, and commodity type (crude oil 
or natural gas), I collect other descriptive components of the announcements. The timing 
of the changes in hedging is categorized as ex ante or ex post based on whether the change 
was announced before or after its implementation. I identify a disclosure as Market View 
when the announcement explicitly states that the change in hedging policy is based on 
expectations of future commodity prices. In contrast, hedging change disclosures 
associated with debt covenants typically are devoid of market views (Beatty, Chen, and 
Zhang 2008) and therefore are characterized as Bank Loans. The remaining events are 
categorized as Others. Furthermore, I search for other firm-specific news surrounding the 
date of disclosure (-1 and +1) in the Factiva database. Announcements are considered to 
be Contemporaneous when the related firm has other news and events within the 
announcement window, and as Non-Contemporaneous otherwise. Table 1 provides 
descriptive details for the entire sample of hedging disclosures. The sample includes a 
total of 490 hedging announcements, with 201 oil and 289 natural gas disclosures.  
[Place Table 1 about here] 
12 
In order to identify oil and gas firms that engage in hedging activities for a 
particular year, I use hand-collected financial derivatives positions and operational 
hedging contracts using 10-K filings disclosed on Edgar. Identifying which firms make 
changes in hedging activity is important for analysis, as companies that do not make 
changes to their hedging policies would not have the justification to voluntarily disclose 
any changes in their hedging program.  
Data from the 10-K filings is used in the calculation of the hedge ratio for each 
firm. This calculated hedge ratio is used to define one of the variables I consider for 
voluntary disclosure. These type of hedging positions are typically reported in the 10-K 
under “Item 7A. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures about Market Risk.” Firms in 
the oil and gas industry tend to provide oil and gas derivative contracts details clearly in 
this part of their annual report, with most providing tables with exact volumes, maturities, 
and price points. This detailed data allows for the collection of the contract type (call, put, 
forward, future, swap, etc.), the maturity of the contracts, volume sold (reported on a per 
day basis, monthly basis, or aggregate amount for the period of the contract), commodity 
type (oil or gas), and agreed upon price(s) of the position. Throughout the data collection 
effort, I focus only on directional contract positions and disregard positions such as basis 
spreads and other non-directional positions.13 Volatility and future prices for all types of 
oil and gas commodities are retrieved from Bloomberg to calculate the delta for each of 
the hedge positions. Deltas for linear contracts (such as loans, forwards, futures, swaps, 
                                                 
13 I follow Jin and Jorion (2006) and Bakke, Mahmudi, Fernando, and Salas (2015) by disregarding the 
non-directional hedge positions for calculating hedge ratios. 
13 
etc.) are assumed to be a value of 1. For option contract deltas, I use the Black and Scholes 
delta to estimate sensitivity of the position to movements in oil and gas prices.14 
 
ii. Measures of Voluntary Disclosure 
Given the difficulty of measuring voluntary disclosure and the lack of consensus 
in the literature, I use four different measures for my analysis. Two of these measures 
have been used previously in the literature, specifically in the context of management 
forecasts.15 The first measure, DISC-Binary, is a binary variable that receives a value of 
1 if firm i in time t provides a change in hedging announcement, and 0 otherwise. The 
second measure, DISC-Count, is simply the number of disclosures that firm i in time t 
provides the market. The next measure, DISC-Ratio, is a novel variable. This measure is 
defined as the number of disclosures that firm i in time t provides the market divided by 
the total number of disclosures for the entire oil and gas industry in year t. The final 
measure, DISC-Transparency, is calculated as the number of disclosures that firm i in 
time t makes divided by the time series volatility of hedge ratio changes for firm i during 
the announcement sample period.16 If the firm does not make an announcement during 
time t, then the value is set to 0. Utilizing several measures allows me to improve the 
credibility of the analysis and any findings are not highly dependent on the disclosure 
variable. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
                                                 
14 For further details on the calculations on hedge ratios, please see Tufano (1996), Jin and Jorion (2006), 
and Bakke, Mahmudi, Fernando, and Salas (2015). 
15 For example, Sengupta and Zhang (2015), use a binary and count measure variable for management 
forecasts. 
16 Throughout the paper, the hedge ratio used for this disclosure measure is based upon the expected 
production one-year ahead in accordance with Tufano (1996). I also alter this variable by calculating the 
hedge ratio based upon reserves in accordance with Jin and Jorion (2006). The results are qualitatively 
similar and for brevity I do not report. 
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iii. Measures of Governance 
I employ commonly used measures of corporate governance from the finance 
literature to test my empirical predictions. These measures are explained in detail in 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Cremers and Nair (2005), and Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2009). These authors show that governance has the ability to affect firm value. 
My study focuses on these governance measures to provide insight into the effect of 
corporate governance on voluntary disclosure.  
Specifically, I investigate three measures of governance based on the degree of 
managerial entrenchment whose definitions are based upon data from RiskMetrics 
(formerly the Investor Responsibility Research Center, IRRC). The first measure, the G-
Index, as created by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), creates a cumulative index score 
based the number of antitakeover provisions included in a firm’s charter along with the 
legal specification of the state where the company is incorporated. This measure takes a 
value between 0 and 24, where the greater the value the more inferior the governance of 
the firm is based on the index.17 The G-Index provides a good starting point for my 
analysis as a corporate governance measure since it’s the most comprehensive of the three 
measures I employ. 
The second measure of governance that I construct and utilize, the ATI, is from 
Cremers and Nair (2005). Their measure is constructed as an alternative takeover index 
(ATI) and consists of three antitakeover provisions. The last governance measure I 
                                                 
17 Data for the G-Index are available approximately every two years up until 2006. Unfortunately, when 
RiskMetrics acquired IRRC, the data collection process was revamped and some of the components are no 
longer available as a result; therefore, I am unable to calculate this index beyond 2006. The specific years 
available for the G-Index are 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. 
15 
construct, the E-Index, is based on the findings of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), 
who emphasize six of the twenty four measures of the G-Index. Bebchuk and coauthors 
show that these six measures have the greatest impact on firm value. These measures of 
governance are central to my analysis as the necessary data are still collected by 
RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC).18  
 
iv. Other Measures  
Finally, I obtain data from RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC), I/B/E/S, Compustat, and 
CRSP to define other relevant variables. Prior literature has demonstrated that each of 
these variables are related to discretionary disclosure practices. These variables include 
board independence (BDIND), board size (BDSIZE), the number of analysts covering the 
firm (AC), and information asymmetry proxied for by analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) 
and return volatility (RVOL). To model the probability that a firm makes a change in their 
hedging program, I use the measures of Leverage, MTB, Size, tax loss carry forwards 
(TLCF), foreign tax credits (TXFO), and quick ratio (QR).19 The last firm control variable 
I include is return on assets (ROA).  
 
v. Research Design  
Investigation of the systematic differences in governance between companies that 
voluntarily disclose hedging changes, and those that do not, is based on a sample of oil 
                                                 
18 I calculate the E-Index from raw data reported by RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) throughout the analysis 
and following the acquisition the data have become available on a yearly basis. As a robustness check, I 
also use the data directly from the authors available from: 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml. 
19 I follow Mian (1996) and Tufano (1996) for the variable definitions of hedging determinants. 
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and gas producing firms (SIC code-1311) during the sample period of 1991 to 2013. SIC 
1311 entities primarily focus on the exploration and extraction of crude petroleum and 
natural gas. These companies provide an ideal setting to study the differences in 
governance and discretionary disclosures as they tend to be quite uniform in their 
exposure to commodity prices and engage in comparable hedging policies.20 These 
similarities across firms within the industry help to mitigate the econometric issues of 
omitted variable bias and/or spurious correlations that would be more prevalent in a study 
that incorporates numerous industries or focuses on a complex, multifaceted industry. 
The SIC 1311 definition is specific to the subgroup of energy firms that engage in the 
exploration and production of oil and natural gas. It excludes several of the larger, more 
widely known, oil companies that are much more vertically integrated and typically 
classified under the heading of “petroleum refining” and the SIC code 2911.21 SIC 1311 
firms are naturally less hedged than these counterparts. Thus, these firms have greater 
exposure to commodity prices as pure-play entities. 
It is often difficult to identify derivative contract-specific information for 
commodity positions of public U.S. corporations (Purnanandam 2008). Oil and gas firms 
provide transparent derivative positions to the public through their annual filings. 
Specifically, these companies provide comprehensive information relevant to each 
commodity derivative position. This detailed information includes the notional volume, 
type of contract, the underlying commodity, and maturity of the contract. Due to the 
                                                 
20 See Jin and Jorion (2006). 
21 SIC 2911 firms include companies such as British Petroleum, Chevron, Exxon Mobil, and Shell. 
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availability of detailed hedge positions, data from SIC 1311 firms has provided the 
foundation for numerous empirical studies.22 
I begin testing my empirical hypotheses using the following regression 
specification: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1  (1) 
where: 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is one of the four measures of discretionary disclosure; 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 is one of 
the three corporate governance indices; and 𝛸𝑖,𝑡−1 is a matrix of control variables. Since 
a higher governance index value indicates fewer shareholder protection provisions, 
evidence that disclosure and governance are complements would be supported by a 
negative 𝛽1. Support for the conclusion that disclosure and governance are substitutes 
would be established by a positive 𝛽1.  
The specification of Equation (1) is similar to many used in the extant discretionary 
disclosure literature. However, this model is subject to possible selection bias as firms 
who do not make changes to their hedging program have no reason to announce changes 
in their hedging activities. Studying discretionary disclosure and governance in the oil 
and gas industry allows for the ability to delineate between the three types of firms for a 
particular year: (a) firms that make changes in their hedging program and voluntarily 
disclose them, (b) firms that make changes in their hedging program but do not 
voluntarily disclose changes in hedging policy, and (c) firms that do not make changes in 
their hedging program or hedge and therefore do not disclose changes in hedging. The 
ability to differentiate between firm type each year helps to minimize any potential bias. 
                                                 
22 These include Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), Jin and Jorion (2006), Kumar and Rabinovitch (2013), 
Bakke, Mahmudi, Fernando, and Salas (2015), among others. The applicability of findings specifically for 
the oil and gas industry to a broader, more diverse set of industries is confirmed by Knopf, Nam, and 
Thornton (2002). 
18 
An alternative method for estimating the differences in governance between 
companies that voluntarily disclose hedging transactions and those that do not involves 
modeling the two successive decisions associated with disclosure: (a) make changes in 
their hedge program or not; and (b) conditional on the decision to make changes in their 
hedging activities, provide discretionary disclosure or not. Accordingly, I use a Heckman 
(1979) two-step model to estimate this two-stage decision process of making a voluntary 
hedging disclosure. In the first stage, I estimate a logit regression to model the likelihood 
that firm i makes a change in hedging policies in year t. I use the following specification 
to model this decision: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐵(∆𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = 1) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 
+𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑋𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1  (2) 
where: 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the firm’s leverage; 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 is the market-to-book ratio of the 
firm; 𝑄𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 is the firm’s quick ratio; 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the size of the firm; 𝑇𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 is a 
measure of the firm’s tax loss carry forwards; and 𝑇𝑋𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 is the firm’s foreign tax 
credits. Using the first stage results, I compute an Inverse Mills ratio to be included in the 
second stage that models the firm’s decision to announce changes in hedging policies.  
The first stage regression uses four instrumental variables to mitigate the potential 
selection bias associated with the choice to make changes in hedging activities and to 
study the governance determinants of a voluntary announcement of changes in hedging. 
The four instruments are 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑄𝑅, 𝑇𝐿𝐶𝐹, and 𝑇𝑋𝐹𝑂. An important requirement 
of any instrumental variable is exclusivity. In the current setting, this requirement dictates 
that the likelihood of voluntary disclosure should only be affected by the instrumental 
variables through the likelihood of a firm making changes to their hedging program. The 
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extant literature supports these as economic determinants of hedging but not determinants 
for discretionary disclosure, thus meeting the exclusivity requirement. 
Following the first stage of estimation, to be included in the second stage, the firm 
must have recorded a change in hedge ratio for the year. The second stage regression of 
the Heckman two-step regression is modeled as the following: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 (3) 
where: 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is one of the four measures of discretionary disclosure; 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 is one of 
the three corporate governance indices; and 𝛸𝑖,𝑡−1 is a matrix of control variables. 
 
IV. Results 
Summary statistics of all variables used throughout the remaining regression 
analyses are reported in Table 2. I winsorize the top and bottom 5 percent of all 
continuous variables to minimize the impact of outliers. To finalize the sample, I restrict 
the data to include information for all independent variables and dependent variables in 
the main portion of the analysis, which results in 417 firm-year observations. Panel A 
provides the descriptive statistics for the sample in its entirety. Approximately 17 percent 
of the firm-year observations (n = 70) make at least one voluntary disclosure. The table 
shows the median (mean) governance scores of 2 (2.2278), 2 (2.2806), and 9 (9.4349), 
respectively for the ATI, E-Index, and G-Index.  
[Place Table 2 about here] 
Panel B of Table 2 reports means, medians, and tests for differences for the sub-
samples of oil and gas firms. The first group includes companies that either do not make 
changes in hedging or do not have a hedge ratio, and accordingly do not have any 
20 
announcements. The second group are firms that have changes in their hedge ratios but 
do not disclose the changes during a given year. The final group are oil and gas companies 
that change their hedging activities and provide discretionary disclosure. Governance as 
measured by the E-Index is significantly different among all three groups, with non-
announcing and non-hedging firms averaging less than two provisions and the groups that 
experience changes in hedging averaging more than two. The initial evidence supports 
corporate governance and discretionary disclosure being substitutes. 
Relative to the two groups that do not make any hedging disclosures, firms that 
make discretionary announcements on average are more likely to have less than 60% of 
their board classified as independent directors. Disclosing companies on average have 
greater information asymmetry, as proxied by RVOL, the year prior to disclosing, than 
the other two non-disclosing sub-samples. These univariate findings provide support for 
governance and discretionary disclosure being substitutes. 
 
i. Determinants of Hedging Announcements  
Initially, I include the entire sample of 1311 SIC companies in a lead-lag 
regression analysis that incorporates the measures of disclosures as the dependent 
variable. I employ four different regression methodologies to account for the nature of 
the dependent variable: (a) DISC-Binary is a binary variable and estimated using logit 
regressions, (b) DISC-Count is a count variable and estimated via Poisson regressions, 
(c) DISC-Ratio is a variable that can range from zero to one and estimated using a 
fractional logit regression, and (d) DISC-Transparency is a measure of the firm’s 
transparency and is censored at zero, thus measured via a Tobit regression with a lower 
21 
limit of zero. The first independent variable of interest is the classic measure of corporate 
governance, G-Index.23 These results are presented in Panel A of Table 3. 
[Place Table 3 about here] 
The results presented in Panel A strongly support the hypothesis that corporate 
governance and discretionary disclosure are substitutes. First, the G-Index is positively 
related to the probability of an announced change in the hedging program across all 
specifications at the 0.01 level, bearing in mind that the higher the governance index, the 
fewer the number of shareholder protection rights. The positive coefficients for G-Index 
explain that, when the marginal firm increases the number of provisions by one unit, the 
firm is 2.83% more likely to provide discretionary disclosures. 
However, these regressions might be subject to the sample selection bias 
described previously as the sample includes three distinct groups. The results in Panel A 
could be just picking up the differences in the G-Index between the disclosure group and 
the group that does not have a hedge ratio or a change in hedge ratio. Accordingly, I 
model for this potential bias using a two-stage process (Heckman 1979). Results of this 
analysis are presented in Panel B. The first stage (column 1) models the firm’s propensity 
to engage in changes in hedging activity for the year of interest. The instrumental 
variables to address the sample selection bias are suggested as determinants of hedging 
by Tufano (1996) and Mian (1996). The second stage models the firm’s decision to 
voluntarily disclose changes in year t and is contingent on the firm having a change in 
hedge ratio in year t (columns 3, 5, 7, and 9). After correcting for this potential bias, the 
                                                 
23 The G-Index is a value between 0 and 24 based on various antitakeover provisions. For an in-depth 
review, please see Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
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results remain and are stronger in magnitude, supporting the hypothesis that corporate 
governance and discretionary disclosure are substitutes.  
Results from Panel B further reveal that board independence, BDIND, tends to be 
negatively associated with the disclosure measures. The marginal firm with more than 
60% of the board comprised of independent directors is approximately 20% less likely to 
disclose changes in hedging. This finding is consistent with governance and disclosure 
being substitutes. Collectively, Table 3 provides evidence that the G-Index and 
discretionary disclosure are substitutes.24  
 
ii. Further Analysis  
One potential concern for the results from Table 3 is that the G-Index is only 
available up until 2006. It is plausible that the results in Table 3 are time-period specific. 
Thus, the previous findings may no longer be applicable as determinants of discretionary 
disclosure. I address this issue by changing the governance measure from the G-Index to 
the E-Index. The E-Index is a more succinct measure of corporate governance and the 
data extends beyond 2006. 
The E-Index is comprised of six of the twenty four provisions from the G-Index. 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrel (2009) extensively investigate the individual provisions of 
the G-Index and find that only six of the provisions provide any economically significant 
reductions in firm value during the period from 1991 to 2003. Given the relevance of 
these particular provisions and the improved data availability, I replicate the previous 
                                                 
24 I use the G-Index as reported by RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) throughout the analysis. As a robustness 
check, I use the data directly available from the authors at 
http://faculty.som.yale.edu/andrewmetrick/data.html and additionally calculate the measure manually from 
the database. My findings remain unchanged. 
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analysis using the E-Index in Table 4.25 For brevity and issues of bias discussed 
previously, I do not replicate Panel A. 
[Place Table 4 about here] 
Focusing on the second-stage of the two-stage Heckman (1979) selection process, 
there is clear evidence that discretionary disclosures and corporate governance, as proxied 
by the E-Index, are substitutes.26 All model specifications yield positively significant 
results at the 0.01 level and marginal effects that are approximately the same as those 
reported in Table 3. This finding supports the notion that disclosure and governance are 
substitutes and is consistent with Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrrell (2009), who conjecture 
that a more precise index of provisions is appropriate.  
Table 4 warrants further discussion regarding various covariates. Relative to the 
G-Index findings, there is evidence that the level of financial analyst coverage, AC, is a 
determinant in the disclosure policies for oil and gas companies. AC is consistently 
positive across the models and highly significant in three of the four specifications. This 
positive relationship suggests that certain measures of governance are complements for 
disclosure and is consistent with the findings in Chen, Chen, and Cheng (2008) and 
Sengupta and Zhang (2015). The positive association contrasts with Tasker (1998) and 
Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller (2003), who find firms with greater analyst coverage are 
less likely to provide other measures of discretionary disclosure. Conversely, BDIND is 
significantly negative across all specifications and reinforces the previous results. The 
                                                 
25 The E-Index is a value between 0 and 6 based on a subset of specific antitakeover provisions used in the 
G-Index. For an in-depth review, please see Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). 
26 I calculate the E-Index from the RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) database throughout the paper. As a 
robustness check, I verify my findings using the data directly provided by the authors available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml. I do not use their data in the paper as it is only 
available for the period of 1990 through 2006.  
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increase in board independence actually leads to a reduction in the probability of 
discretionary announcements, consistent with governance and disclosure being 
substitutes. Table 4 provides the first evidence that Size is related to the probability to 
disclose changes in hedging activities by SIC 1311 companies. Specifically, Size 
negatively impacts the informational environment of the firm. The main takeaway in 
using the E-Index is that there is further evidence that corporate governance and 
discretionary disclosure are substitutes. 
The evidence thus far suggests the possibility that any antitakeover provision and 
any combination of the provisions might lead to an increase in a firm’s discretionary 
disclosure. To investigate this likelihood, the ATI proposed by Cremers and Nair (2005) 
is a suitable measure as it shares only three provisions of the G-Index and one from the 
E-Index. I replicate previous regression analyses using the ATI. Interestingly, in Table 5, 
there is no evidence that the ATI is a determinant of voluntary disclosure for oil and gas 
companies. Table 5 suggests that the provisions are not exchangeable with regard to their 
impact on the corporate information environment. Consistent with Table 4, Size (AC) is 
negatively (positively) associated with the firm’s discretionary disclosures. 
[Place Table 5 about here] 
To this point in the analysis, I have disregarded the role of institutional investors 
on a firm’s information environment. Investors often invest in oil and gas companies as 
a proxy for investing directly in the commodities. Changes in hedging alter a firm’s stock 
price exposure to changes in oil and gas price (Tufano 1998). As investors differentiate 
between firms based on hedging policies, changes in hedging activities should be 
important for shareholders, especially large institutional investors. Increases in the level 
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of institutional ownership of a firm are associated with greater levels of voluntary 
disclosure (Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999; Bushee and Noe 2000). However, evidence 
exists that firms are less likely to engage in discretionary disclosure as institutional 
holdings become more concentrated (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005; Karamanou 
and Vafeas 2005). It is plausible that the measures of governance were serving as proxies 
for institutional ownership and that incorporating this variable into the analysis will affect 
the evidence in favor of corporate governance and disclosure being substitutes. 
I address this possibility by incorporating INST as an additional covariate in the 
previous regression analyses. For brevity, I report only the second stage regression 
coefficients and p-values in Table 6. There is evidence that firms with greater institutional 
ownership increase disclosure policies of oil and gas firms that make changes in hedging 
policies.27 The G-Index and E-Index continue to provide strong support that corporate 
governance and disclosure are substitutes. 
[Place Table 6 about here] 
The inclusion of INST provides valuable insight into the covariates beyond the 
variables of interest. Size is now a significant negative for all disclosure measures across 
all models.28 The interpretation of these results is ambiguous; larger firms are less likely 
to disclose hedging announcements, but on average there is more information concerning 
large firms in the market and Size is also associated with greater analyst coverage (Barth, 
Kasznik, and McNichols 2001). This finding contrasts with the positive result for AC, as 
an increase in analyst coverage increases the probability of discretionary announcements. 
                                                 
27 I replace the institutional ownership variable with a continuous level of ownership and find similar 
results. 
28 Previously, Size was insignificant in the models utilizing the G-Index as the governance measure. 
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Finally, BDIND continues to be negative and provides supporting evidence that is 
consistent with governance and disclosure being substitutes.  
The hypothesis that corporate governance and discretionary disclosure are 
substitutes has been substantiated up to this point, providing evidence that firms with 
fewer shareholder protection provisions are more apt to voluntarily disclose information 
concerning changes in hedging positions. However, it is not clear why more entrenched 
firms (i.e., firms with fewer shareholder protection rights) would be willing to disclose 
this additional information. Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) provide a theoretical 
framework incorporating the costs and benefits of increased transparency. Accordingly, 
firms weigh the costs and benefits of discretionary disclosures to arrive at an optimal level 
of disclosure. In this situation, it is plausible that the costs of not disclosing changes in 
hedging for firms with fewer shareholder protection provisions outweigh the benefits of 
non-disclosure. 
Testing what can entice these firms to disclose is of importance. Healy, Hutton, 
and Palepu (1999) and Bushee and Noe (2000), provide evidence that increases in 
institutional ownership are positively related to disclosure levels. This foundation 
suggests that institutional ownership may have the ability to influence disclosure policy 
by applying pressure on management. One would then expect to find that higher levels 
of institutional holding should have differential effects on the firm’s disclosure policies 
relative to the governance of the firm. To further substantiate that disclosure and corporate 
governance are substitutes, there should be evidence that greater institutional ownership 
in low governance firms (i.e., higher levels of the E-Index) should exhibit a positive 
relation regarding discretionary disclosures. This institutional ownership effect should be 
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either non-existent or negative for high governance firms (i.e., lower scores of the E-
Index). Accordingly, I divide the sample into two groups based on the median of the E-
Index and run the previous regressions in Table 7 on the two sub-samples.  
[Place Table 7 about here] 
Columns 1 through 4 report the second stage of the Heckman analysis for firms 
with greater shareholder protection provisions. INST is consistently negative and 
significant in one of the models. Columns 5 through 8 provide the analysis for firms with 
fewer shareholder protection provisions. This sub-sample provides supporting evidence 
that higher institutional ownership can positively impact discretionary disclosures of 
poorly governed firms. 
Another possibility that would explain the support for disclosure and corporate 
governance being substitutes is that the level of governance subsequently changes 
following a firm’s initial discretionary disclosure. In short, firms may begin disclosing 
changes in their hedging program and follow that by changing the number of shareholder 
provisions adopted by the firm. The firm continues to disclose leading to our previous 
findings. To investigate this possibility, I use a change regression to regress the change 
in governance levels on an indicator variable for the first time the firm voluntarily 
announced a change in hedging activity. The lack of significance of the initial disclosure 
indicator in Table 8 helps to minimize this concern.  
[Place Table 8 about here] 
Finally, specific provisions may differentially impact the disclosure policies for 
SIC 1311 firms that make changes in their hedging positions. Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrrel (2009) identify the six provisions, i.e., the E-Index, that have the ability to 
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significantly influence firm value. Appropriately, I do not make predictions on the signs 
or significance of the individual provisions on the disclosure policy of the company. I 
replicate Table 4 with the six provisions of the E-Index in place of the E-Index value. As 
Table 9 indicates, provisions that limit shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws, require 
more than a majority to approve a merger, and provide management with golden 
parachutes increase the probability that firms will make disclosure announcements. There 
is also marginal evidence that firms where shareholders have limited ability to amend the 
corporate charter experience a negative impact on the disclosure environment.  
[Place Table 9 about here] 
The results throughout provide support for corporate governance and 
discretionary disclosures being substitutes. Specifically, firms with fewer shareholder 
protection provisions (higher levels of the G-Index and E-Index) are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose changes in their hedging program. I provide empirical evidence 
against the possibility of sample selection bias and reverse causality/correlation. I also 
provide evidence that various shareholder provisions have differential effects, as well as 
support for institutional ownership having the ability to exert pressure on management 
and impact the information environment of the firm. Collectively, the findings suggest 
corporate governance and discretionary disclosure are substitutes.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Previous studies document that governance measures have the ability to influence 
a firm’s information environment. The extant literature fails to arrive at a consensus 
among various measures of governance and over whether the measures complement or 
29 
substitute for discretionary disclosure. In this study, I investigate whether the voluntary 
disclosures made by SIC 1311 companies are complements or substitutes to the existing 
governance levels of the firms. The voluntary disclosure measures are constructed using 
a hand-collected sample of 490 announcements of changes in hedging policies made by 
oil and gas companies between January 1991 and January 2013. This particular data 
allows me to control for sample selection bias and omitted variable bias due to 
heterogeneity between complex industries while understanding how governance impacts 
the firm’s voluntary disclosure.  
The findings in this paper reveal novel evidence regarding the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm disclosure policies. Specifically, I find 
overwhelming evidence that firms with fewer shareholder protection rights have a 
positive relationship with the discretionary disclosure of hedging announcements within 
the oil and gas industry. This finding is robust in the analysis for the G-Index and E-Index 
but not for the ATI, indicating there are differential effects between provisions. There is 
also evidence that institutional investors exact pressure on firms with relatively poor 
governance to increase disclosure. Evidence throughout indicates that firms with fewer 
shareholder protection rights are not only more likely to disclose changes to their hedging 
practices but also provide more of them. Furthermore, the interaction between 
institutional ownership and shareholder provisions have ramifications for firm disclosure 
policies. 
My findings contribute to the literature by providing evidence that the corporate 
governance of a firm is related to a firm’s disclosure environment. The evidence suggests 
that firms are aware of the perceived costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure. For oil 
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and gas companies with poor governance relative to industry peers, the evidence strongly 
supports the notion that benefits of disclosing hedging activities greatly outweigh any 
potential costs. The inferences of this study extend far beyond the oil and gas industry 
since the relationship between corporate governance and discretionary disclosure is 
pertinent across the corporate world, especially given the extensive prevalence of hedging 
activities associated with commodity, currency, interest rate, and other risk exposures. 
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Chapter 2: 
 
Is Good News for a Firm also Good News for a Nearby Firm? 
Geography and Comovement of Stock Returns29 
 
I. Introduction 
Previous studies show that comovement in stock returns cannot be fully explained 
by common economic factors (Barberis and Shleifer 2003; Barberis, Shleifer, and 
Wurgler 2005; Kumar and Lee 2006; Pirinsky and Wang 2006). While these studies 
provide valuable insights on how investors behave, there is still a limited understanding 
on the channels through which investors incorporate seemingly unrelated news into stock 
prices. This paper helps fill the void in the literature by examining the effects of good 
news of a company on firms that do not have correlated cash flows while sharing a similar 
investor base. Specifically we examine how a firm’s dividend initiation announcement 
(positive news) influences stock prices of seemingly unrelated firms. 
A priori, it is not clear that positive news of a firm would affect stock prices of 
seemingly unrelated firms in absence of correlated cash flows or risks. It is possible that 
individual investors may not use these news announcements in assessing the value of 
unrelated firms, such that the effect of positive news is restricted to the equity value of 
the news creating firm and does not affect seemingly unrelated firms. Alternatively the 
news announcement may serve as an attention-grabbing event and result in positive 
spillover effects for seemingly unrelated firms amongst investor clientele. Individual 
investors have a documented tendency to invest in firms that are established locally 
                                                 
29 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Vahap B. Uysal. 
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(Coval and Moskowitz 1999, 2001; Huberman 2001; Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2005, 
2008). Limited resources (DellaVigna and Pollet 2009) and “coarse thinking” (Massa and 
Zhang 2009) may lead investors to place a greater value on a particular group of firms 
(e.g., dividend paying companies) based on their affiliation with the news generating firm 
(e.g., dividend initiation). Thus, a release of positive news, which attracts a local 
individual investor clientele (e.g., senior citizens), may cause the underlying clientele of 
investors to favorably view non-news generating firms that are in the same group as the 
positive news-generating firm. This new association may lead to a spillover of positive 
news announcement, generating an increase in the stock prices of seemingly unrelated 
firms in the presence of a large investor clientele (positive-investor-attention hypothesis). 
The positive news may be at the expense of seemingly unrelated firms without 
any news announcements. Specifically, firms compete for the investor attention 
(Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2009) and firms with news announcements tend to capture 
considerable attention from individual investors (Barber and Odean 2008). Limited 
resources confine the ability of individual investors to process relevant stock market 
information (DellaVigna and Pollet 2009). In response, individual investors attempt to 
efficiently allocate their available resources and shift their focus to firms that are 
generating positive news in the market. This in turn may generate an adjustment in their 
portfolios: selling or not buying non-news generating firms while purchasing positive 
news generating firms in the same group. Thus, the shift in attention may generate an 
unfavorable market reaction for the seemingly unrelated firms (investor-distraction 
hypothesis). 
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We test the aforementioned hypotheses by assessing the impact that similar 
investor clientele has on the stock prices of seemingly unrelated dividend paying and non-
dividend paying firms in response to a dividend initiation of a firm located within the 
same metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Specifically, we define observations as 
seemingly unrelated firms, if the firms are located in the same MSA, but are categorized 
in a different industry as the news creating firm. Prior studies have documented that 
dividend initiation announcements generate positive abnormal returns (Asquith and 
Mullins 1983; Healy and Palupu 1988; Michaely, Thaler, and Womack 1995) and attract 
considerable investor attention (Barber and Odean 2008). Thus, we employ dividend 
initiations as positive news for this study. By focusing on dividend initiations, we are able 
to clearly identify the avenue in which a news generating firm influences stock prices of 
seemingly unrelated firms in the presence of a specific investor clientele for the 
underlying firms. 
Dividend paying and non-paying firms constitute differing clientele bases (Bell 
and Jenkinson 2002). Especially, senior citizens form an important clientele for dividend 
paying firms and have correlated trades which can influence stock prices (Graham and 
Kumar 2006). Geographical location also generates investor clienteles. Specifically, 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show that investors tend to invest locally. Combined with 
the studies on dividends, these studies suggest that senior citizens should invest in the 
stocks of dividend paying companies located within the same MSA; thereby, forming a 
geographically segmented investor clientele. To ensure that our results are not driven by 
correlated cash flows of firms in the same industry, we exclude firms from the same 
industry grouping in the same MSA as the dividend initiating firm. This empirical design 
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also allows us to assess the effect of news of a firm on other firms that do not have 
correlated cash flows, but share a similar investor clientele. 
The findings in this paper reveal novel evidence on the comovement of stock 
returns. Specifically, after accounting for firm characteristics and common 
macroeconomic shocks in a region, we find that seemingly unrelated firms in an MSA 
receive a favorable market reaction of 40 basis points when there is a high percentage of 
senior citizen population in the MSA. The positive reaction results are found specifically 
for dividend paying firms, while non-dividend payers do not experience a significant 
impact. Collectively, these findings are consistent with the positive-investor-attention 
hypothesis as firms’ equity prices are benefiting from an investor clientele of senior 
citizens, who incorporate the positive news into all dividend paying firms located in the 
area. 
We take further steps to examine robustness of the findings. The results of the 
paper are robust to several model specifications and numerous relatedness classifications 
including Hoberg and Phillips Text-based Network Industry Classifications (Hoberg and 
Phillips 2010a, 2010b). We also run separate regressions for mean variables both at the 
dividend initiation announcements and at the MSA levels. The results remain intact for 
the sub-sample of seemingly unrelated dividend paying firms in MSAs with a relatively 
high proportion of senior citizens. However, non-dividend payers did not receive a 
significant market reaction from the news. We also examine the effect of investor 
concentration on our findings. As the hypotheses are implicitly built upon the irrational 
behavior of individual investors, the findings should be prominent in the presence of low 
institutional ownership. We investigate this notion by interacting the senior citizen 
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variable with high and low institutional holding. Our results reveal that dividend paying 
firms in areas with high senior citizen concentration receive positive market reaction only 
if there is low institutional ownership. 
We further examine alternative economic hypotheses that may explain our 
findings. First, the positive market reaction for dividend paying firms located within areas 
with a high percentage of senior citizens might be an effect that all dividend paying firms 
experience similar reactions. We are able to dispel this notion as seemingly unrelated 
firms located outside of the MSA of the initiating firm did not experience a significant 
shock to their equity prices. Second, the supply of dividend payers in the MSA at the time 
of the announcement may be the reason for the findings. Specifically, few dividend 
paying firms in an MSA may generate the findings of the paper if these firms are located 
in areas with high percentage of senior citizens. Upon introducing the number of dividend 
paying firms, at the time of the dividend initiation in the MSA in the analysis, the findings 
of the paper are unaffected. Third, the positive market reactions to seemingly unrelated 
dividend paying firms may be attributed to the expectation of these firms to increase their 
own payout policy following the dividend initiation. However, dividend paying firms do 
not subsequently increase dividend payout following a firm initiating a dividend in the 
same MSA. Finally, seemingly unrelated dividend paying firms may experience an 
increase in their cash flows subsequent to the dividend initiation in the same MSA. We 
do not find supporting evidence for this hypothesis either. Collectively, these findings are 
not fully consistent with the alternative hypotheses and lend further support to the 
positive-investor attention hypothesis. 
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This paper relates to studies examining the comovement of stock returns. Pirinsky 
and Wang (2006) find that comovement of stock returns in an MSA cannot be fully 
explained by firm fundamentals. By reporting that high percentage of senior citizens 
influence market reactions to seemingly unrelated firms in the same MSA, the paper 
suggests regional investor clientele as a channel through which the comovement of stock 
returns can transpire. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature that investigates the 
implications of a firm’s location on stock returns. Local investors tend to invest more 
heavily in local companies and have the ability to impact the equity prices (Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner 2005; Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2008). The findings in this paper suggest that 
the ability of the demographic composition surrounding the firm to influence stock 
returns depends on the match between local investor clientele and firm characteristics. 
Our paper is also related to previous studies that examine the effects of investor 
psychology. Investors do not always act rationally when incorporating news 
announcements and analyzing a firm’s fundamentals (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam 1998; Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh 2006; Hirshleifer, Hou, 
Teoh, and Zhang 2004; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2009; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). 
Our findings in the paper contribute to these studies by not only documenting evidence 
that the local demographics of a firm engage in coarse thinking but that their behavior is 
directional. Investors direct their attention positively towards the new group of firms 
associated with the positive news generating firm. Thus, this type of investor behavior 
does not uniformly impact the equity valuations for all companies located within the same 
MSA. 
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Finally, results of this study improve the understanding of the implications for 
dividend announcements. Prior literature has shown that dividend initiations result in 
positive market reactions for the company making the announcement (Asquith and 
Mullins 1983; Healy and Palepu 1988; Michaely, Thaler, and Womack 1995). Our 
research contributes to this vein of literature as providing support that dividend 
announcements do not only favorably impact the announcing firm but also other dividend 
paying firms that are located within the same geographical proximity. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section II discusses the development of the 
relevant hypotheses. Section III provides details of sample selection and descriptive 
statistics of the data. Section IV reports the univariate results based on the percentage of 
senior citizen population. Section V discusses the regression analyses, and Section VI 
provides robustness checks. Section VII concludes the chapter based on the findings. 
 
II. Hypotheses Development 
There has been substantial evidence of comovement of stock returns. Among 
others Barberis and Shleifer (2003), Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) and Kumar 
and Lee (2006) show that common economic factors cannot fully explain comovement 
in stock returns. One of the channels that may generate comovement of stock returns is 
the collective behavior of an investor clientele (Antón and Polk 2014). Specifically, 
investors that invest in a group of firms based on group characteristics, rather than 
individual firm characteristics, may generate correlated stock returns among the firms in 
the group. 
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Limited attention of investors may lead them to pay attention to group 
characteristics. Specifically, individual investors are not only limited by available 
resources (DellaVigna and Pollet 2009), but also by the amount of attention that they can 
expend when evaluating a firm’s prospects (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2009). Limited 
attention leads investors to focus on groups of firms of which they are aware (Barber and 
Odean 2008). Furthermore, investor characteristics influence the group of firms that the 
limited attention will be directed towards (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001). Thus, investors 
are likely to focus on characteristics of firm groups that fit best with the needs of 
investors. To the extent that these investors form a critical mass (clientele), they are likely 
to influence stock valuations. 
Investor reactions responding to a firm’s significant news event (Ahern and 
Sosyura 2014; Tetlock 2007) tend to go beyond just the specific firm generating the news. 
The news announcement not only captures investor attention for the firm with the news, 
but also may attract attention to firms with similar characteristics. A sizeable clientele 
response can result in spillover effects for firms that do not generate any news. 
In order to test the idea that investors revise their investments of non-news 
generating firms in response to a positive news announcement of a firm in the same group, 
we focus on the effect from the presence of local investor clientele (i.e., senior citizen 
population in a MSA) on market reaction to dividend paying firms in the same MSA, in 
response to dividend initiation of a firm in the same MSA. Dividend initiations are 
significant favorable events that attract investor attention (Peng and Xiong 2006). As the 
stock price movement for new dividend paying firms is significantly positive upon the 
initiation announcement (Asquith and Mullins 1983; Healy and Palepu 1988; Michaely, 
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Thaler, and Womack 1995), dividend initiations portray the firm in a positive manner to 
the investors. Furthermore, these positive events are widely cited in the popular media 
outlets that are likely to capture the attention of investor clientele for dividend paying 
firms. 
Senior citizens are a specific investor clientele that pay great attention to dividend 
paying firms. In particular, senior citizen investors tend to show a preference for owning 
dividend paying stocks (Graham and Kumar 2006). Furthermore, dividend initiations are 
widely cited in popular media outlets which furthers the likelihood in attracting attention 
of senior citizens. Thus, senior citizens establish an identifiable clientele for dividend 
paying firms. 
Dividend initiations also attract special attention from the local investor clientele. 
As investors tend to invest locally in firms that are in their same MSA (Coval and 
Moskowitz 1999, 2001; Huberman 2001; Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2005, 2008). This also 
suggests higher level awareness of local stocks by local investors. Feng and Seasholes 
(2004) also show that investor groups located within the same region tend to buy and sell 
securities in unison patterns within a reasonable time frame. Investors that are 
geographically close in proximity tend to invest in similar patterns, which provides the 
foundation for comovement among stock prices in the same MSA. Collectively, senior 
citizens in an MSA generate clientele for dividend paying firms in the same MSA, which 
may shed light on the stock price comovement for firms that are located in the same MSA, 
but not the same two-digit SIC code as the dividend initiating firm (seemingly unrelated 
firms). 
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The attention of senior citizens toward dividend initiating firms can bring 
recognition to other dividend firms in the same MSA. Previous studies show that 
investors evaluate a company based on a firm’s grouping rather than the firm’s 
fundamentals (Barberis and Shleifer 2003; Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler 2005; Patton 
and Verardo 2012). For example, Massa and Zhang (2009) show positive spillover effect 
for acquirers’ values when they pair up with popular targets. That is, investors view 
acquirers more favorably if they have a favorable opinion of the target firms. A firm with 
a significant news announcement not only draws investor attention to themselves but 
other firms with similar characteristics. As dividend initiations attract positive attention 
for the announcing firm, the news may attract positive attention for other dividend paying 
firms. This positive spillover of investor attention for other local dividend paying firms 
may result in a favorable market reaction in the presence of local clientele for seemingly 
unrelated dividend paying firms, leading to the positive-investor-attention hypothesis: 
 
H1: Seemingly unrelated dividend paying firms will obtain a favorable market 
reaction when a firm making a dividend initiation announcement is located in an area 
with a high percentage of senior citizens. 
 
Alternatively, the finite amount of investor attention may lead to seemingly 
unrelated firms competing with each other for investor attention (Barber and Odean 
2008). Firms attract considerable investor attention when they announce the initiation of 
dividends to shareholders. The increase in investor attention coupled with limited investor 
resources provides understanding that the increased awareness of the dividend initiating 
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firm may come at the expense of other local dividend paying firms. For example, 
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) document the impact of earning announcements on the 
equity valuation is dependent on how many other firms are announcing and the 
relatedness between firms making the announcements. Competition for investor attention 
should intensify as firms compete for similar clientele, specifically, local investors (Coval 
and Moskowitz 1999, 2001; Huberman 2001; Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2005, 2008). 
Existing local dividend clientele may adjust current portfolio allocations to reflect 
the new information revealed by the dividend initiation. The potential reallocation of 
limited investor resources may negatively impact other local dividend paying firms. For 
instance, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008) provide evidence that the more numerous firms 
are in a particular area the lower respective stock price when firms go public, ceteris 
paribus. A new dividend paying firm provides local senior citizen investors with an 
additional option for their portfolio, intensifying the competition for attention from this 
identifiable investor clientele. In response to this heightened competition, seemingly 
unrelated dividend paying firms may experience an initial negative market reaction when 
another local firm initiates a dividend in the presence of a local clientele, establishing the 
investor-distraction hypothesis: 
 
H2: Seemingly unrelated dividend paying firms will experience an unfavorable 
market response when a firm located in an area with a high percentage of senior citizens 
makes a dividend initiation announcement. 
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III. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample consists of firms that are present in both COMPUSTAT and CRSP 
from 1980 to 2011. As we are analyzing the impact of a positive news announcement of 
a firm on surrounding firms, we restrict the positive news sample to just dividend 
initiations to accurately identify other firms that are located in the same MSA. 
For MSA specific characteristics we consult the U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. In classifying the location of the firm’s headquarters, which 
is identified using the metropolitan statistical area of the firm, we follow a previous study 
in the locality literature (Almazan, De Motta, Titman, and Uysal 2010). After determining 
the MSA for the company generating the positive news, we identify all other public firms 
located within the same MSA. The data set excludes: (i) companies headquartered in 
Hawaii and Puerto Rico; (ii) dividend initiations and firm observations by financial firms 
(SIC codes 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999); and (iii) firms with 
less than $10 million in total assets. If observations are missing either debt or cash 
accounting values, we replace with a value of zero. We winsorize all variables used in the 
analysis at the bottom and top 1% to reduce the effect of outliers. 
We narrow our focus to seemingly unrelated firms that do not have correlated 
cash flows and risk with the underlying dividend initiating firm. As firms in the same 
industry have correlated cash flows, we exclude all firm observations that are classified 
into the same two-digit SIC code as the company making the announcement. As news 
announcements generated by seemingly unrelated firms may influence their own stock 
returns, we remove all firms that announce their quarterly earnings and dividend 
announcements in the same month as the dividend initiation announcement. A final data 
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screen we implement is the requirement that each dividend initiation possess at least 10 
remaining firm observations in the same MSA. This screen is attributed to the findings of 
Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008) where a few firms located in a specific area can create a 
larger bias and increase in stock valuations by local investors. The final sample consists 
of 748 unique dividend initiation announcements with a total of 28,233 seemingly 
unrelated firm observations. 
Previous geographic literature sheds light on the impact of the population of 
senior citizens within an MSA on a firm’s dividend policies (Becker, Ivkovic, and 
Weisbenner 2011). The population makeup and density within an MSA has a direct 
correlation in participation by those investors who reside in more sociable and active 
financial communities (Brown, Ivkovic, Smith, and Weisbenner 2008). Therefore, we 
assign a binary variable that receives the value of one if the observation is located in the 
top quartile of the sample in terms of the percentage of senior citizens within a MSA. 
This data is collected from the U.S. Census Bureau and measured as the population 
estimates for each MSA by year. This senior citizen variable allows us to capture the 
portion of stock returns explained by this particular investor clientele. 
To assess the market reaction, we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns for 
firms located within the same area as the firm with positive news. This cumulative 
abnormal return is derived by utilizing market adjusted returns. We employ the estimation 
window of -5 to +5 days relative to the corresponding day of good news (dividend 
initiation announcement date). The extended window allows us to control for leakage of 
information in the pre-announcement period. It is also imperative for us to allow investors 
ample time to incorporate this new information into the market for seemingly unrelated 
44 
firms (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2009). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 
B. 
Table 10 provides the descriptive statistics for the entire sample. The mean 
cumulative abnormal return is 30 basis points, and there is a large variation around the 
mean (standard deviation of 740 basis points). This suggests that stock prices of firms in 
the MSA do not uniformly respond to dividend initiations. Dividend paying companies 
comprise 54.6% of the entire sample. Therefore, the data are representative of both 
dividend paying and non-dividend paying companies. Approximately, one-third of all the 
firm observations are located in the 20 most populous cities in the United States. The 
Senior Citizen variable represents the top quartile in terms of senior citizen density within 
the MSA; this value is comprised of firms located in areas where the total population is 
comprised of more than 12.8% senior citizens. 
 [Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
IV. Univariate Analysis 
This section examines the effect of the geographical demographics on the 
cumulative abnormal returns experienced by seemingly unrelated firms in the same MSA 
as the firm that initiates dividends. Table 11 reports the mean cumulative abnormal return 
for the percentage of senior citizens in the MSA quartiles. In Panel A of Table 11, the 
mean CAR of the highest senior citizen percentage quartile is 0.0048, while it is 0.0024 
for the lowest quartile. The difference is 24 basis points and statistically significant 
(p<0.10). We further find dispersion in the cumulative abnormal returns between the 
bottom (-0.0004) and top (0.0024) quartiles of 28 basis points in the sub-sample of 
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dividend paying firms (p<0.05). However, the difference of CAR for non-dividend paying 
companies between the senior citizen quartiles is not statistically significant. These 
findings suggest a disparity in market reactions generated by differential payout policies. 
Collectively, these findings provide preliminary evidence in support of the positive-
investor-attention hypothesis. 
We also examine whether our findings are driven by local macroeconomic shocks. 
Particularly, Panel B reports the effects of high density of senior citizens on CAR across 
state unemployment rate quartiles. We find a negative disparity of CAR between the high 
and low density of senior citizens in three of the four state unemployment rate quartiles. 
Notably, the difference in CAR is significant in the presence of favorable local 
macroeconomic conditions (smallest quartile of observations for the state unemployment 
rate). This suggests that our findings are not driven by positive shocks to the local 
economy. We further control for the state of local macroeconomic conditions in the 
models. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
Panel C provides further evidence that our findings are not driven by firms located 
in small cities. Specifically, Panel C examines the observations from companies located 
within the 20 most populous cities in the United States and outside the populous cities. 
There is a negative disparity between the first and fourth quartiles of senior citizen density 
for firms located within and outside the 20 most populous cities. The difference is 
significant for firms located within the 20 most populated cities, suggesting that our 
findings are not driven by firms located in small cities. We further account for the 
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differences between observations within and outside the most populous cities in the 
multivariate regressions. 
We also examine the effect of senior citizens across size quartiles, as large and 
well established firms are more likely to pay dividends to shareholders (Fama and French 
2001). However, Panel D documents a notable negative difference of -0.0058 in stock 
price reaction for the smallest firm size quartile amongst the quartiles of senior citizen 
percentages, while all quartiles experience a negative disparity. Panel E reports that the 
lowest quartile of observations, based upon Tobin’s Q, experiences a meaningful negative 
difference of -0.0073 between the first (0.0060) and fourth (0.0133) quartiles of senior 
citizens. Senior citizens are more likely to invest in large firms with low Tobin’s Q 
(Graham and Kumar 2006). Consistent with this investor preference there are significant 
positive returns for low Tobin’s Q firms in areas with a high concentration of senior 
citizens. This result highlights the important role senior citizen clientele have on local 
firms when aligned with their investor preferences. 
Overall, the univariate analysis provide preliminary evidence in support of the 
positive-investor-attention hypothesis. The findings lend support to the concept that a 
particular group of investors (in this case senior citizens) may engage in coarse thinking 
and not incorporate the good news of a dividend initiation uniformly across all firms 
located the same MSA. The univariate analysis exhibits the importance of controlling for 
various factors that are consistent with the investing behavior of senior citizens in the 
multivariate regression analysis. 
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V. Regression Analysis 
In this section, we examine the comovement of equity values for seemingly 
unrelated firms to positive news announcements from other firms located within the same 
MSA. Our empirical methodology follows previous event studies as we conduct a short-
term event study and calculate the market adjusted returns for each seemingly unrelated 
firm using the CRSP value-weighted index. We use the cumulative abnormal returns as 
the dependent variable to analyze how a firm’s positive news announcements influences 
the stock prices for seemingly unrelated firms located within the same MSA. The 
dependent variable also allows us to disentangle and identify the channels where a firm’s 
good news influences the comovement in stock prices for seemingly unrelated firms in 
the same geographic proximity. 
Macroeconomic factors have the ability to influence a firm’s prospects and market 
expectations. Specifically, local shocks to firms located within a particular geographic 
region may generate correlated cash flows; thereby driving comovements in stock 
valuations. Following Korniotis and Kumar (2013), we use the unemployment rate within 
the firm’s state during the year as a proxy for regional economic shocks. Previous studies 
on economic geography show the effect of populous cities on investor behavior (Coval 
and Moskowitz 2001; Malloy 2005). Coval and Moskowitz (2001) document that 
investors located in the most populous cities tend to hold a higher percentage of their 
assets locally. This relation has the ability to affect local stock returns as investors can 
gather “soft information” on locally based firms. Investors place a higher value on this 
type of investment research which is considered to be private or personal insight into the 
firm (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sybrahmanyam 1998). The difference in the population of 
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the area in which a firm is located also has a direct effect on the analysts covering the 
companies in a particular area (Malloy 2005). Therefore, we collect the 20 most populated 
cities in the country from the U.S. Census Bureau from 1980 – 2011; there are minor 
changes to this variable in the temporal setting as cities become less and more populated. 
For the time period of the sample, there were a total of 25 different cities that made the 
list; therefore, we implement a binary variable that is time invariant for all firm 
observations located within these 25 cities. 
To control for a stock price run-up (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993; Grinblatt, 
Titman, and Wermers 1995), we calculate the previous quarter’s return for the stock. The 
univariate analysis conducted in Section 4 provided evidence for the need to control for 
total sales of the firms, as senior citizens’ market reaction was different across the quartile 
of smallest firms. We also control for the number of firms in the same MSA so that small 
MSA size is not driving our findings (Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2008). Finally, we account 
for the firm’s Tobin’s Q, as Table 11 provides, supporting evidence that senior citizens 
distinguish the differences between firms with low Tobin’s Q. 
The econometric issues that need to be closely monitored are the correlations 
between observations and the clustering of observations, as well as the correlation 
between firms within the same industry. To address the first concern, we employ robust 
clustered standard errors by MSA (Petersen 2009). Differences in the time when the 
initiation announcement is made are controlled for by using year fixed effects. 
Table 12 reveals a strong effect of senior citizen density on stock price reaction 
of seemingly unrelated firms. Specifically, Senior Citizen variable is significantly 
positive at the 5% level. The effect is also economically significant. In a response to 
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dividend initiation announcement of a firm in a MSA, there is a favorable market reaction 
of 40 basis points to the equity price of seemingly unrelated firms located in the same 
MSA when there is a large senior citizen population. This finding is consistent with the 
positive-investor-attention hypothesis. 
We further examine whether the effect is uniform across firms that have a similar 
history as the dividend initiating firm. The results of separating the whole sample into 
dividend paying firms (column 5) and non-dividend paying firms (column 9) are in Table 
12. The Senior Citizen variable is persistent, representing an increase of stock price by 30 
basis points and is statistically and economically significant for the dividend payer 
subsample. However, the senior citizen density does not significantly impact the equity 
prices of seemingly unrelated non-dividend paying firms. Therefore, the dividend paying 
sample is driving the results and lends support in favor of the positive-investor-attention 
hypothesis. 
These findings are critical for the understanding of the channels that are driving 
the cumulative abnormal returns for seemingly unrelated firms located within the same 
MSA. As senior citizens prefer dividend paying firms over non-dividend payers, the 
significant effect of senior citizen density in the subsample of dividend paying subsample, 
and the insignificant effect in the subsample of non-dividend paying subsample, is 
consistent with the investor attention hypothesis. The effect of senior citizens is 
prominent when these firms are already in the radar screen of local senior citizen clientele. 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
We have included several firm and MSA characteristics that may influence CAR. 
However, there may be omitted variables that are driving our findings. Therefore, Table 
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12 reports regression analyses with fixed effects for years (columns 2, 6, and 10), firms 
(columns 3, 7, and 11), industries, and MSAs (columns 4, 8, and 12). Our initial findings 
for the sample remain intact with the introduction of fixed effects. When analyzing the 
fixed effects models for the dividend paying sample, Senior Citizen continues to be 
significant and positive for all models, responsible for a stock price increase of 
approximately 30 basis points. Senior Citizen is insignificant for the sample of non-
dividend paying companies. After accounting for by MSAs, industry, and firm 
characteristics, these findings lend further support to the view that seemingly unrelated 
dividend paying firms obtain a favorable market reaction when a local firm, in an area 
with a high concentration of senior citizens, makes a significant positive news 
announcement. 
Other firm characteristics also help explain variation in market reaction to 
seemingly unrelated news. Specifically, Stock Return is highly significant and negative 
with a value of 0.004 for the entire sample. Stock Return continues to be negative and 
significant for dividend paying firms. This is indicative that the momentum of the returns 
for the previous quarter does not tend to continue. 
 
VI. Robustness Checks 
We employ numerous robustness tests, to verify the inferences from our previous 
findings. The first robustness procedure we engage in is to incorporate the Text-based 
Network Industry Classifications (TNIC) data (Hoberg and Phillips 2010a, 2010b), which 
have been shown to improve upon SIC codes. The TNIC relatedness data are based on 
textual analysis of a firm’s 10-K, which pair firms with other firms based on similarity 
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scores annually. We screen the data to exclude all firms located in the same two-digit SIC 
code and firms that are closely related by evidence from the TNIC pair-wise 
classification. As these data measures are only available for the period of 1996 to 2008, 
the sample is reduced even further. The total sample for this analysis is 10,668 
observations. 
After incorporating the TNIC relatedness screens into the data, the previous 
findings are unchanged. Table 13 reports that CAR experiences a positive significant co-
movement in equity prices for seemingly unrelated firms located within an area with a 
high density of senior citizens. Upon separating the data into dividend payers and non-
dividend payers, we document a positive shock of 90 basis points to the stock price for 
dividend paying firms (p-value<0.01), while non-dividend payers do not experience a 
significant market reaction in the model. Table 13 substantiates the findings that dividend 
paying firms in areas with a high density of senior citizens receive a positive impact from 
another local firm’s dividend initiation announcement. 
 [Insert Table 13 about here] 
Table 13 incorporates fixed effects along with the additional relatedness measure 
into the model. The findings in Table 13 substantiate the previous results as seemingly 
unrelated dividend paying firms receive a positive stock price reaction of approximately 
100 basis points when located in areas with a high concentration of senior citizens. Senior 
Citizen for the non-dividend paying sample remains insignificant to the incorporation of 
the additional relatedness screens. Collectively, not only do the previous results continue 
to hold, but are strengthened by incorporating the additional relatedness measure into the 
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sample. Thus, our findings are not driven by the limitations of relatedness measures 
associated with SIC codes. 
We also employ two mean regressions methods to test the hypotheses in the paper. 
The first is averaging the variables across each individual dividend announcement and 
treating this as a single observation. This method allows us to assess whether the previous 
findings are driven by a few dividend announcements. The second method is averaging 
all the observations by the MSA of the dividend initiating firm, resulting in a single 
observation for each of the MSAs represented in the data. This mean regression enables 
us to test whether the findings are generated by a large number of dividend 
announcements in a few MSAs. 
The intention of calculating the average of each announcement by the relevant 
firm observations in the first mean regression is to verify that the previous results are not 
being motivated by a select few dividend initiations. This results in the sample size 
decreasing from 28,245 total observations to 748 unique dividend initiation observations. 
Table 14 columns 1 through 3 report the results for the mean regressions of dividend 
initiation announcements. The regressions for the dividend paying firms yields similar 
results to the previous findings where the senior citizen percentage of the MSA 
significantly increases the equity valuations of dividend paying companies by 40 basis 
points (p<0.01). In the non-dividend paying sample the Senior Citizen variable remains 
to be insignificant. These results are consistent with the positive-investor-attention 
hypothesis as regions with a high percentage of senior citizens reward dividend payers in 
the event of a dividend initiation by a firm within the same MSA. 
[Insert Table 14 about here] 
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Table 14 columns 4 through 6 provide the results from the second mean regression 
in which we utilize based on the average for all variables across a particular MSA. The 
sample yields 26 observations and three regressions as the construction of the analysis 
does not allow for any type of fixed effects. As the clustering of standard errors by MSA 
is not permissible; we apply the correction to the standard errors by the White’s method 
(White 1980). Despite the limited sample size, we continue to find supporting evidence 
that dividend paying companies within a geographic location with a high percentage of 
senior citizens experience a significantly positive comovement in stock prices of 70 basis 
points (p<0.01), when another firm initiates a dividend policy. The effect of senior 
citizens is not significant for the sub-sample of non-dividend paying firms. These findings 
suggest that a particular area is not generating our results, strengthening the evidence in 
support of the positive-investor-attention hypothesis. 
Firms that are relatively young in their life cycles have greater mobility 
opportunities than their older counterparts in relocating the firm based on the growth and 
investment opportunities of a particular geographic location. A firm’s initial location is 
strategically chosen to be conducive to the success of the firm and take advantage of 
knowledge spillovers (Alcácer and Chung 2007). It is imperative to disentangle the 
effects of this choice. Therefore, the unobservable characteristics that go into a firm’s 
decision where to locate become less relevant over time. To relieve this concern, we 
execute regression analyses on the sub-section of firms that have been public for at least 
10 years in Table 15. 
The evidence in Table 15 is in line with the investor attention hypothesis. 
Specifically, the cumulative abnormal returns are positively significant not only for the 
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dividend paying sample (p-value<0.05), but the whole sample (p-value<0.10) with stock 
price reaction of approximately 30 basis points. The impact of the percentage of senior 
citizens in the area continues to be insignificant for non-dividend paying firms. These 
results suggest that the findings of the paper are not being influenced by younger firms 
and their choice in locating the firm. 
 [Insert Table 15 about here] 
The positive-investor-attention hypothesis is built upon behavioral explanations 
which rely on behavior of individual investors. Thus, the effect should be prominent for 
firms with low institutional holdings. We obtain institutional holdings measures from the 
CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings database. As most companies file semi-annually, we 
confine our attention, as in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), to year-end reports for 
institutional holdings. Consistent with previous studies, we set institutional holdings to 
zero for firms that do not have institutional investors reported in the dataset. We measure 
institutional holdings as the ratio of shares held by institutional investor relative to total 
shares outstanding. We define high institutional holding as a binary variable, if the 
institutional holdings for the firm in the year preceding the dividend initiation is located 
in the top quartile of the sample. Observations not in upper quartile are identified as low 
institutional holding. 
Table 16 provides regression analysis for the institutional holdings of the sample. 
The cumulative abnormal returns are significantly positive when there is a large 
percentage of senior citizens and low institutional holdings for both the entire sample (p-
value<0.01), and the dividend paying sub-sample (p-value<0.01). However, the effect of 
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senior citizen is not significant when there are high institutional holdings. Collectively, 
these findings are consistent with the positive-investor-attention hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 16 about here] 
It is plausible that macroeconomic factors impacted equity returns for all dividend 
paying firms located in areas densely populated with senior citizens, not only those 
located in the same MSA as the initiating firm during the event window. To alleviate this 
concern, we collect relevant data pertaining to all firms outside the MSA where the 
dividend initiation occurred. Following the same data screens used in the previous 
analysis, the sample of unrelated dividend paying firms, defined as firm observations 
outside the MSA and not within the same two-digit sic code of the announcing firm, 
consists of 168,878 observations (columns 1 through 4). Table 17 includes a variety of 
fixed effects in the regression analysis and the Senior Citizen variable is significant for 
the base model for the dividend sub-sample, but becomes insignificant once fixed effects 
are introduced. Thus, the insignificant effect of senior citizens on stock prices of firms 
located outside of the dividend initiating firm suggests that macroeconomic shocks are 
less likely to drive our findings. 
[Insert Table 17 about here] 
It is also viable that the dividend initiation announcement influences the equity 
prices of related firms (same two-digit SIC code) that are located in other geographical 
areas with high percentages of senior citizens. We address this issue by retrieving the data 
for all dividend paying firms with the same two-digit SIC code that are not in the same 
MSA as the initiating firm for the sample. Ignoring the data screen of requiring ten 
observations per MSA, we employ the remaining data requirements; the resulting sub-
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sample of dividend paying outside MSA observations of related firms consists of 9,333 
observations (columns 5 through 8). Table 17 implements numerous fixed effects in the 
regression analysis and the Senior Citizen variable remains insignificant across the sub-
sample, except when firm fixed effects are incorporated, Senior Citizen becomes negative 
with marginal significance. Table 17 provides additional evidence that the main finding 
is contained to seemingly unrelated firms within the same geographic location of the 
positive news announcement. The conclusion provided by Table 17 further lends support 
to the hypothesis that when a firm initiates a dividend in an area with a high percentage 
of senior citizens, seemingly unrelated dividend paying firms in the same MSA 
experience a favorable equity reaction. 
An alternative explanation for the findings in the paper is that the limited supply 
of dividend paying firms in the MSA for local senior citizens may generate positive 
returns for seemingly unrelated firms. Specifically, our findings may be driven by 
observations where there are relatively few dividend paying firms in the MSA as the 
dividend initiating firm. We alleviate this concern by replacing the number of firm 
observations for each dividend initiation with the number of dividend paying firm 
observations. Table 18 reports findings that are consistent with previous findings where 
the dividend paying sample receives a significantly positive reaction of approximately 30 
basis points. The level of dividend paying firms are not responsible for the positive stock 
market reaction for seemingly unrelated dividend paying companies in areas with a high 
concentration of senior citizens. 
 [Insert Table 18 about here] 
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The finding that seemingly unrelated dividend paying firms receive a positive 
market reaction may be driven by the increase of their dividend payouts following the 
dividend initiation. Therefore, we collect the payout policy of the firm one year prior to 
the declaration date and the payout policy the year following the initiation. If the firm 
increased dividend payouts the year following the initiation announcement, the Dividend 
Increase binary variable receives a value of one and zero otherwise. Table 19 reports 
coefficient estimates of the probit model in which the dependent variable is the Dividend 
Increase variable. Seemingly unrelated dividend paying firms located in areas with high 
senior citizen density do not have a higher probability of increasing dividend payout after 
the initiation announcement. This provides further evidence that dividend paying firms 
within densely populated areas with senior citizens were not more likely to increase 
dividends than those that were not following the dividend announcement. Thus, our 
findings are less likely to be attributed to future changes in the payout policy of local 
firms. 
[Insert Table 19 about here] 
A plausible economic driver for the findings is that the dividend paying firms 
located in areas with a high percentage of senior citizens in the sample may experience a 
significant increase in their cash flows the year of the dividend initiation. Thus, our 
findings may be reflecting the market rewarding these firms for the increase in 
profitability and has no correlation to the dividend initiation announcement of a nearby 
firm. To address this possibility we calculate the mean industry adjusted change in 
profitability (EBITDA/TA) from the year of the initiation to the firm’s prior year 
profitability for the dividend paying sample. Table 20 shows that dividend paying firms 
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located in areas with a high density of senior citizens do not experience a significant 
change in their profitability the year of the initiation announcement. These results 
combined with those from Tables 16, 17, 18, and 19 are not fully consistent with the 
alternative hypotheses and rather strengthen the evidence in support of the positive-
investor-attention hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 20 about here] 
In a final robust analysis we re-estimate the model using multiple dependent 
variables calculated across a variety of extended event windows, including the event 
window (-0, +0), a three-day window (-1, +1), and a five-day window (-2, +2). As our 
focus is dividend paying firms in areas densely populated with senior citizens, we only 
report the estimates of the dividend paying sub-sample of the data, and for brevity we do 
not report the estimates of the control variables. Using the event day (columns 1 through 
4) as the dependent variable, Table 21 shows that seemingly unrelated dividend paying 
firms located in areas with a high percentage of senior citizens have a significant positive 
equity reaction to the dividend initiation across all specifications. The three-day event 
window (columns 5 through 8) is significantly positive across all qualifications. The last 
model reported is representative of the five-day event window (columns 9 through 12) 
and provides supporting yet weaker results as Senior Citizen is only significant for the 
base model and the firm fixed effects regression. Table 21 exhibits suggestive evidence 
that the length of the event window is not dictating the findings and supports the positive-
investor-attention hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 21 about here] 
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VII. Conclusion 
Previous studies document that the comovement of stock prices is not fully 
explained by firm fundamentals. The ability of an individual firm’s actions to have an 
effect on stock prices of surrounding firms is important to understand; however, the 
literature provides limited evidence of these channels. In this study, we investigate how 
and why investor clienteles contribute to stock price comovement. Controlling for firms 
with correlated cash flows and risks, provides us the setting to study the direct market 
reaction of a news announcement on seemingly unrelated firms who possess similar 
investor clientele. 
The findings in this paper reveal novel evidence on the comovement of stock 
returns. Specifically, we find evidence that capital markets react favorably to seemingly 
unrelated firms in an MSA with a high percentage of senior citizens when a firm makes 
a dividend initiation announcement. This finding is prevalent for dividend paying firms 
and insignificant for non-dividend paying firms providing evidence of the positive-
investor-attention hypothesis. The persistency of this outcome is robust to numerous 
empirical methods and measures. Evidence throughout indicates positive spillover effects 
of significant positive news (e.g., dividend initiations) for seemingly unrelated firms 
within the same geographical location in the presence of individual investor clientele 
(e.g., senior citizens). 
Our findings contribute to the literature by providing evidence that the local 
demographics of a firm influence stock returns. We identify a channel in which news 
announcements of a firm have the ability to affect other local seemingly unrelated firms. 
The evidence suggests that a firm’s local investor clientele observe significant news 
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announcements of one local firm and associate the announcement as news for other 
seemingly unrelated firms within the same MSA. The preferences of particular investor 
clientele in firm characteristics can help explain the comovement of equity returns 
between firms in the same geographical area. 
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Chapter 3: 
 
Benefits of Government Bank Debt Guarantees: 
Evidence from the Debt Guarantee Program30 
 
I. Introduction 
Recent financial economics literature has often focused on government 
intervention and the potential negative consequences thereof. In particular, Dam and 
Koetter (2012), Hryckiewicz (2014), and Poole (2009) share a negative perspective on 
the economic impact of government intervention upon the financial system. Likewise, 
criticism of government guaranteed bank deposits has proliferated. Pennacchi (2006) and 
Gropp, Gruendl, and Guettler (2014) show that deposit insurance is linked to increased 
risk-taking. Still, the magnitude and the frequency of government intervention into 
financial markets suggests that there may be some positive effects. Recent theory 
provided by Cheng and Milbradt (2012) suggests that bailouts can increase economic 
value by instilling confidence in credit markets. Furthermore, the far reaching benefits of 
government bailouts may have the ability to outweigh any moral hazard effect (Cordella 
and Yeyati 2003). 
Government intervention often plays a critical role in resolving financial crises. 
We provide detailed analysis for a relatively new kind of intervention – government 
guaranteed bank bonds – by documenting the widespread benefits throughout the banking 
and financial sector. Our sample utilizes bonds issued by financial firms that were insured 
against default by the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC) under the Debt 
                                                 
30 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Jeffrey R. Black and Duane Stock. 
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Guarantee Program (DGP). This program was the first government guarantee of publicly 
traded corporate bonds in the United States. The importance of our research is enhanced 
as the adoption of governments offering bank bond guarantees has recently gained 
popularity by governments as a tool in response to financial crises. The bond guarantees 
that were adopted by many other nations in response to the most recent financial crisis 
were thought to be helpful in preventing bank failures and subsiding a more severe credit 
crisis. Debt guarantees in other countries have also been successful in curbing the 
deterioration of the public confidence in the banking system (Schich 2009). 
The purpose of this research is to understand how well bond guarantees 
accomplish their intended objective of reducing the risk of a systemic meltdown during a 
financial crisis by way of increasing bank bond liquidity.31 This study provides strong 
evidence that a government guarantee of newly-issued bank debt during times of financial 
turmoil improves bank bond liquidity, which reduces rollover risk for the issuing entity, 
and ultimately lowers the overall default risk of the institution (not just the default risk of 
the insured bonds). Our findings establish empirical support for the adoption of bank debt 
guarantees as a financial tool in the midst of a financial crisis. 
A first order effect of issuing guaranteed bank bonds is the significantly greater 
bond market liquidity relative to uninsured counterparts. We estimate the bid-ask spreads 
on FDIC-insured bonds were about 83.9% smaller than uninsured bonds of the issuing 
firms. This enhanced liquidity allows the government-insured debt to boast dramatically 
lower transaction costs than non-insured debt and thus inject liquidity into a bank’s debt 
                                                 
31 We consider liquidity throughout the remainder of the paper as the ease of buying or selling a bond, as 
measured by the natural logarithm of the bid-ask spread consistent with the bid-ask spread methodology 
of Hong and Warga (2000). 
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markets. The augmented liquidity of these debt issuances significantly reduced borrowing 
costs through multiple channels. 
In accordance with financial policy crafted with the intent to alleviate concerns 
about the “financial accelerator,” described by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), 
the benefits for each bond issue are positively correlated with the default riskiness of the 
issuing firm. Intuitively, guaranteed bonds can be issued at lower yields due to the 
reduced default risk. This yield reduction benefit could potentially be completely offset 
by an insurance premium paid to the guarantor reflecting the issuing firm’s default risk. 
If so, in the broad context, the firm itself receives a limited direct cost benefit by issuing 
guaranteed debt, but may still realize increased demand for their guaranteed debt issues 
and thus realize greater liquidity for their bonds. However, we find guaranteed bond 
yields were 435 basis points lower than yields of non-guaranteed issuances (net 329 basis 
points after accounting for the insurance premium paid to the FDIC). 
As intended, the safety of the insured debt instruments attracted considerable 
demand, significantly increasing the liquidity of guaranteed bonds, compared to their 
uninsured counterparts. Participation in the guarantee program increased with the relative 
liquidity improvement compared to non-guaranteed issues. Herein is the central purpose 
of a debt guarantee program. As investors embark on a flight to quality during turbulent 
economic times, the government-guaranteed safety of the insured bonds is meant to 
attract safety-seeking investors to bank debt. This insured bank debt often replaced 
maturing debt for the firm, reducing rollover concerns and, ultimately, firm default risk 
as well. The ability of each bank to reduce its unique default risk lessens the overall risk 
of contagion and crisis throughout the financial sector. 
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We examine the cross-sectional variation in this benefit to determine which bank 
characteristics commanded a greater benefit. Riskier firms and firms issuing debt during 
more risky times received a larger yield reduction, even after accounting for the insurance 
premium paid. This evidence suggests policy makers were concerned about the “financial 
accelerator,” in which small systematic shocks are amplified by the deleterious actions 
(i.e. default, reduction in credit extension, or a decline in spending) of weaker firms which 
are adversely affected by the original shock.32 Seemingly in accordance with concerns 
about the “financial accelerator,” policy makers constructed the program and insurance 
premiums to assist riskier and weaker banks to a greater extent than others. One way this 
was accomplished was via a positively-sloped term structure of insurance premia, given 
that we find a negative credit spread term structure (CSTS) for weaker banks. By 
instituting a positively-sloped term structure of insurance premia for all firms, 
irrespective of individual firm risk, the program not only provided greater benefits to 
riskier firms, but also encouraged them to issue shorter-term rather than longer-term debt 
for their rollover purposes. These results favor the ideology that financial institutions in 
the greatest need for support in accessing public debt markets during a crisis should be 
able to receive the most government support, consistent with Bernanke et al. (1996). 
As suggested above, we show the CSTS of debt for riskier banks, which was 
negatively sloped for uninsured debt, was transformed to a positive slope for guaranteed 
debt, thus encouraging banks to rollover maturing debt (high risk during times of 
economic turmoil) using insured, lower-rate, short term debt. A negatively-sloped CSTS 
for high-risk bank debt is consistent with the Merton (1974), Lee (1981), and Longstaff 
                                                 
32 The financial accelerator is described in greater detail by Bernanke et al. (1996), Krishnamurthy (2010) 
and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008). 
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and Schwartz (1995) theoretical solutions for the term structure of credit spreads. In 
contrast, we find a flat CSTS for highly rated debt (AAA and AA) which is also consistent 
with classic theory of credit spreads. 
Besides the above classic theory of term structure of credit spreads, we 
furthermore consider how term structures of credit spreads are affected by rollover risk 
and investor preferences in a crisis. He and Xiong (2012) maintain that the financial crisis 
of 2008 strongly illustrated how deterioration in liquidity interacts with an increased 
default risk thus increasing credit spread. Hence, rollover cost considerations, when 
added to other numerous factors affecting CSTS slope, encourage the CSTS to be 
negatively sloped as is portrayed in their computations. Separately, Gorton, Metrick, and 
Xie (2014) propose a theory of CSTS during financial crisis, stressing the impact of lender 
behavior. They posit this effect should cause the slope of the CSTS to be positive. Our 
results indicate the rollover effect of He and Xiong (2012) may dominate the credit 
tightening effect of Gorton et al. (2014) as we find a negatively-sloped CSTS during the 
crisis. 
While augmented debt market liquidity and reduced cost of debt are pleasing 
benefits to the banks participating in a government guarantee program, another related 
goal of a bank debt guarantee is to more broadly reduce default risk of the firm and the 
contagion risk to the economy. Our empirical analysis suggests the marginal firm’s 
default risk (measured by its 5 year credit default swap spread) decreased by 
approximately 5% when participating in the DGP. This reduction in default risk, 
stemming from the increased liquidity and DGP participation is the first empirical 
evidence supporting the theory proposed by He and Xiong (2012) and He and Milbradt 
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(2014). The improvement in default risk is also consistent with Greatrex and Rengifo 
(2012) who find that other instances of government intervention during the financial crisis 
reduced CDS spreads. 
He and Milbradt (2014) hypothesize an endogenous loop of improving debt 
market liquidity and default risk. Accordingly, Liu, Longstaff, and Mandell (2006), and 
Ericcson and Renault (2006), among others, show a strong positive correlation between 
liquidity and credit quality. The government guaranteed bank debt, which exogenously 
lowers default risk, may improve the liquidity of otherwise unaffected non-guaranteed 
bonds of these same banks. On the other hand, it is plausible that guaranteed bonds 
exogenously affect the level of default risk for a firm without directly impacting the 
liquidity of outstanding non-guaranteed bonds as the guaranteed securities are the only 
bonds explicitly protected against default risk. In fact, the effect of insured bonds upon 
non-insured bond liquidity of the same firms could be negative, as the newly issued 
guaranteed bonds could direct investor attention away from the outstanding, non-insured 
bonds. We test this using a difference-in-differences approach and find that bid-ask 
spreads on non-guaranteed bonds of participating firms declined (liquidity improved) by 
more than 12% following their DGP participation announcement. This is the first such 
test of this half of the endogenous liquidity-default loop because there rarely exists an 
event which exogenously affects the default risk of a security without directly affecting 
liquidity, as is the case here. The DGP is thus an optimal setting for such a test. The results 
of the difference-in-differences analysis appear to confirm the assertion made by He and 
Milbradt (2014) that lower default risk increases debt liquidity. 
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A legitimate concern for many citizens and policymakers with regard to a 
government bond guarantee would be the losses experienced on guaranteed debt defaults. 
Anecdotally, this was not the case with the DGP. In the specific case of the DGP, only 
six institutions defaulted on their insured liabilities, resulting in a $153 million loss to the 
FDIC – which was less than 2% of the total premiums collected under the program (FDIC 
2013), suggesting that the FDIC enjoyed a gross profit of approximately $10.2 billion. 
The evidence from our analysis suggests the beneficiaries of bank bond 
guarantees were widespread throughout the banking and financial sector. We observe that 
the outcome of DGP participation was not only beneficial to all stakeholders involved, 
but also consistent with recent financial theory. However, it is important to understand 
the quality of the guarantee provided through this particular program. We acknowledge 
that it may not be appropriate to generalize these findings and suggest all governments 
follow suit, as the guarantee in the DGP was backed by the United States government, 
considered by many to be a sovereignty without default risk. Government bank bond 
guarantees, while not appropriate in every situation, can be a very effective form of 
government intervention in the midst of a financial crisis, particularly in the cases of 
exceptionally strong guarantors. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an in-depth explanation of 
the FDIC Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, and the Debt Guarantee Program in 
particular. Section III develops the relevant hypotheses. Section IV provides details of 
the sample and descriptive statistics of the data. Section V reports the empirical findings. 
Finally, Section VI concludes the research. 
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II. FDIC Debt Guarantee Program 
The financial crisis of 2008 triggered numerous large U.S. government 
interventions into the financial sector. Perhaps the best known intervention was the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program, TARP, wherein the U.S. Treasury purchased preferred 
stock of numerous banks.33 Separate from TARP, the FDIC executed a program called 
the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) which consisted of two 
components. The first part and most widely known portion of TLGP was the Transaction 
Account Guarantee Program (TAGP) wherein the FDIC fully guaranteed non-interest 
bearing transaction accounts. The second portion of TLGP was the Debt Guarantee 
Program (DGP). This research focuses on the second component, in which the FDIC 
insured senior unsecured debt issued under the DGP, in return for an insurance premium. 
Morrison and Foerster (2009) estimate that about two thirds of senior unsecured bank 
debt issued after the peak of the crisis was insured under the DGP program. An important 
aspect of this program was that it was the first instance of a U. S. Treasury guarantee of 
corporate bonds in the United States.34 
Initially, all eligible financial institutions were automatically enrolled into both 
TAGP and DGP programs with coverage beginning at the approximate peak of the crisis 
on October 14, 2008. The enrolled entities had until December 5, 2008 to decide whether 
or not the entity would choose to participate in the programs. In contrast to TARP, the 
FDIC published the banks that decided to opt-out of any part of the program, leaving the 
names of those that chose to stay in the program unannounced with no regard to whether 
                                                 
33 Kim and Stock (2012) and Veronesi and Zingales (2010) analyze how different claims were affected by 
TARP issuances. 
34 The guarantee was through the FDIC where it was clearly stated that the guarantees were backed by the 
full faith and credit of the U. S. Treasury. 
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they desired to participate or simply ignore the program. Due to this procedure, we use 
the bank’s first announcement of a guaranteed bond issue as the public’s first confirmed 
knowledge of the bank’s participation in the DGP. 
The principal function of DGP was to provide a guarantee on new issues of senior 
unsecured debt offered by the financial institution. The FDIC (2008) cites the purpose of 
this program was “to strengthen confidence and encourage liquidity in the banking system 
by guaranteeing newly issued senior unsecured debt of banks, thrifts, and certain holding 
companies, and by providing full coverage of non-interest bearing deposit transaction 
accounts, regardless of dollar amount.” The debt guarantee limit was restricted to 125% 
of the face value of senior unsecured debt that was outstanding as of September 30, 2008 
and scheduled to reach maturity on or before June 30, 2009 (Federal Register 2008). 
Financial entities with no senior unsecured debt within the specified time period were 
provided a limit for bond guarantees of two percent of the total consolidated liabilities as 
of September 30, 2008. The last day to issue debt under the DGP was October 31, 2009, 
and the debt guarantee expired either at maturity or on December 31, 2012, whichever 
came first. The DGP applied to a very large proportion of bank funding and thus allowed 
for a maximum of approximately $1.75 trillion of insured debt to potentially be issued35, 
wherein approximately $618 billion was actually issued. The insurance premia applicable 
to the DGP are outlined in Panels A and B of Table 22, where Panel A describes premia 
for earlier issues and Panel B describes additional premia for issuances after April 1, 
2009. 
[Insert Table 22 about here] 
                                                 
35 According to Morrison and Foerster (2009) there was 1.4 trillion of eligible debt outstanding at the end 
of September 2008. Thus, firms could have used 1.75 trillion of insured debt (125% of 1.4 trillion). 
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III. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Government guarantees allow firms to rollover their maturing debt by creating 
additional demand for their bonds during turbulent market conditions. By comparing 
spreads of assets with different safety but similar liquidity, as well as different liquidity 
but the similar safety, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) show that investors 
demand both the liquidity and the safety of US Treasuries. During a flight-to-quality 
episode, this demand is intensified, leading investors to extend troubled or suspect firms 
a smaller portion of credit extended, raising rollover costs and consequently raising 
default risk. 
A debt guarantee from a credit-worthy government will mitigate the effects a 
flight-to-quality episode for poor credit quality institutions, as it improves the credit 
quality of any debt issue to that of the guaranteeing entity. This will increase demand for 
that security, which should manifest in greater liquidity. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Government-guaranteed bonds are significantly more liquid than their 
non-guaranteed counterparts. 
 
The financial accelerator occurs when a small shock to a financial system is 
amplified by worsening market conditions for one or more reasons, which in turn leads 
to weaker firms defaulting and further worsening market conditions. Bernanke et al. 
(1996) presume that at the onset of a recession, due to a flight-to-quality, a lesser 
proportion of credit will be extended to weaker firms. This increases the cost of external 
funding for these firms. The increased cost of funds reduces the borrower’s production 
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and ultimately encourages default. This will lead these firms to become a proportionally 
greater part of the decline in economic activity. 
Furthermore, in order to diminish any effects of the financial accelerator, policy 
makers should target the firms which are most likely to default. Accordingly, weaker 
banks should receive a larger share of the benefits afforded from any government 
intervention in order to reduce the risk of the financial accelerator defined by Bernanke 
et al. (1996). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Bond issuances of riskier firms receive a greater reduction in cost of debt 
from a government guarantee than bond issuances of safer firms. 
 
Similarly, and by the same logic, a government guarantee should be constructed 
in such a way that debt issuances during more turbulent times should receive a larger 
reduction in the cost of debt. This relationship does not even need to be a function of the 
insurance premia structure provided by the insuring agency. In fact, this relationship 
should be rather mechanical since yields of uninsured bonds should be higher during more 
turbulent times; and insured bonds, which default risk is of little to no concern, should be 
rather unaffected by general market volatility. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Government guaranteed debt issued during more volatile market 
conditions receive a greater reduction in the cost of debt. 
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For a government guarantee to be constructed in a way which favors the riskiest 
firms, the insurance premium paid for the guarantee should not vary by individual firm 
characteristics. In fact, in the specific case of the DGP, the insurance premium did not 
vary by firm characteristics, but instead by the maturity of each issue, as exhibited in 
Table 22. Thus, one should expect that the credit spread reduction associated with each 
debt issuance would vary by maturity. Therefore, we describe the complex theory and 
empirical evidence of how CSTS behave, as well as illustrate the potentially strong 
qualitative differences about CSTS shape and slope for different credit qualities in  
Figure 2. 
Research on credit spread term structure has a long history beginning with Merton 
(1974) where, in the first structural model of credit spreads, he gives arbitrage-free 
solutions for CSTS. His classic results, later refined and corrected by Lee (1981), are that 
lower credit quality bonds may well have a negative CSTS slope, but the slope for high 
grade bonds is qualitatively different. That is, higher credit quality bonds have a hump 
shaped CSTS, where the credit spread first increases with maturity, peaks at some 
maturity, and then declines. See Figure 2 for qualitatively representative plots of Merton’s 
(1974) theoretical results. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
In another classic theoretical paper, Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) give CSTS 
plots using alternative measures of credit quality such as the value of the firm relative to 
a low threshold firm value where default occurs and, the volatility of firm value. The 
qualitative results are broadly similar to Merton (1974) where, for example, high quality 
firms have a positive slope throughout or, alternatively, a humped shape where the 
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negatively sloped portion has only a mild negative slope. Figure 2 shows a high grade 
term structure qualitatively representative of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). 
Empirical tests of CSTS typically use nonfinancial firms as the sample. Among 
these many empirical tests of CSTS, Sarig and Warga (1989) and Fons (1994) find a 
negative CSTS. More recently, Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2006) find, on 
average, the CSTS for banks, including strong banks, is negatively sloped. However, the 
negative slope is much stronger and much more statistically significant for low credit 
quality banks compared to higher credit quality banks. The average negative slope found 
by Krishnan et al. (2006) is qualitatively represented in Figure 2. In contrast to the above 
literature, Helwege and Turner (1999) find the CSTS tends to always have a positive 
slope. More recently, Covitz and Downing (2007) support a positively sloped CSTS. In 
summary, classic theory suggests many alternative shapes and slopes of CSTS. 
Furthermore, the empirical testing of CSTS slopes do not yield clear predictions. 
In the case of the DGP, the cost of debt reduction would not be homogenous across 
firms due to the positive term structure of the insurance premium. Riskier firms would 
realize greater benefits when issuing short term debt over long term, while safer firms 
would not necessarily benefit more or less based on their maturity choice. 
 
Hypothesis 4: For higher-risk firms, shorter-term government guaranteed debt issuances 
receive a greater reduction in cost of debt than longer-term debt; however, for lower-risk 
firms the cost of debt reduction from a government guarantee does not vary by maturity. 
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Clearly a government debt guarantee will lead to a reduction in default risk on a 
bond level for the individual guaranteed issuances. However, for a government 
intervention to be successful in mitigating contagion risk, default risk of banks must be 
reduced on a firm level – not only for specific, guaranteed issuances. 
He and Xiong (2012) develop a theory in which a firm’s default risk is dependent 
on debt market liquidity. He and Milbradt (2014) extend their work, theorizing an 
endogenous loop in which default risk and debt market liquidity are dependent on one 
another. The dependence of default risk on liquidity is caused by more liquid debt 
instruments having lower yields, which lowers actual firm costs. This raises the optimal 
default boundary of a firm, lowering its default risk. Therefore, because guaranteed debt 
issuances are more liquid than non-guaranteed issuances, and carry a lower cost of debt, 
the overall firm default risk should be reduced if a firm participated in a government debt 
guarantee program. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Participation in a government debt guarantee leads to a decrease in 
default risk at the firm level. 
 
As stated previously, He and Milbradt (2014) assume liquidity is determined, in 
part, by default risk. This has never been strictly shown in the empirical literature due to 
the endogenous loop between liquidity and default risk. However, participation in a 
government debt guarantee creates a pseudo natural experiment by exogenously reducing 
default risk of the firm (and therefore all of its bonds) without directly affecting the 
liquidity of non-guaranteed bonds on an ex ante basis. Therefore, when observing the 
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change in the bid-ask spreads of the non-guaranteed bonds of participants in a government 
debt guarantee, one would expect to see the liquidity improve relative to the rest of the 
bond market. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The previously outstanding, non-guaranteed debt issued by participants in 
a government debt guarantee experiences an improvement in liquidity. 
 
This research contributes to several strands of literature. First and foremost, it 
extends the current line of literature relating to the benefits of government intervention 
(Cordella and Yeyati 2003; Veronesi and Zingales 2010; Cheng and Milbradt 2012; 
Ambrose, Cheng, and King 2013; Hryckiewicz 2014) by being the first to empirically 
document how government debt guarantees alleviate stress in the banking and financial 
sector during financial crises. While Veronesi and Zingales (2010) look broadly at the 
DGP, estimating an extreme transfer of wealth from taxpayers to bank bondholders, our 
study differs in that we document the specific benefits of government debt guarantees, 
including the liquidity enhancement of debt, the cost of debt reduction, and the reduction 
in default risk – as well as documenting the FDIC’s ex post profit from the DGP. 
The next area in which this study contributes is the pricing of government 
guaranteed debt. Many urged the FDIC to adopt a risk-based program, with insurance 
premia ranging from 10 to 50 basis points depending on CAMEL rating.36 Several studies 
argue that moral hazard is an inherent concern of government debt guarantees (Schich 
2009; Levy and Schich 2010; Levy and Zaghini 2010; Grande, Levy, Panetta, and Zaghini 
                                                 
36 See the Federal Register, Part VII, FDIC, 12, CFR Part 370. 
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2011) and would suggest that riskier firms should have to pay a larger insurance premium 
than safer firms to mitigate further moral hazard. Contrarily, we contribute to the 
literature by showing that the DGP was actually priced according to the theory of the 
financial accelerator (Bernanke et al. 1996; Krishnamurthy 2010; Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy 2008) and by not changing the insurance premia based on risk. 
Policymakers inherently provided a greater reduction in the cost of debt to riskier firms 
and firms issuing debt during riskier times, theoretically in an effort to mitigate contagion 
risk. 
This important contribution is enhanced since the United States is not the only 
government to respond to a financial crisis by offering bank debt guarantee. The bond 
guarantees that were adopted by many other nations in response to the financial crisis 
were thought likely helpful in preventing bank failures and more severe credit crises 
(Grande et al. 2011). Schich (2009) finds that guarantees of other countries were useful 
in curbing the deterioration of the public confidence in the banking system. Levy and 
Schich (2010) analyze the design of the different bank bond guarantee programs across 
different countries. Levy and Zaghini (2010) investigate the determinants of yield spread 
differences between guaranteed bonds in different countries. This literature is relatively 
new with many important questions yet to be answered. 
Next, we contribute to the vein of literature on the shape and slope of the term 
structure of bank yield spreads. In contrast to Helwege and Turner (1999), Covitz and 
Downing (2007) and Krishnan et al. (2006), we find that during the financial crisis, the 
term structures of bank yield spreads were negatively sloped for riskier firms and flat for 
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safer firms, which aligns closer to theory of Merton (1974), Lee (1981), and Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1995). 
Finally, we contribute to the literature pertaining to bank rollover risk and the 
endogenous liquidity-credit risk loop (Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer 2011; He and 
Xiong 2012; He and Milbradt 2014) by showing that the improved liquidity and reduced 
cost of debt provided by government guaranteed debt both reduces default risk of firms 
and improves the liquidity of previously issued, non-guaranteed bank debt. The effect of 
lowered default risk improving liquidity has long been assumed but to our knowledge we 
are the first to show the causal relationship, due to the endogenous nature of default risk 
and liquidity. 
 
IV. Data Description 
The bond data we use to conduct the research is comprised of all bond trades from 
the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) database from 2008 through 
2009. We use this time frame because bonds insured under the DGP had to be issued 
between October 14, 2008 and November 1, 2009. Furthermore, this period was one of 
financial stress and we wish to analyze yields and spreads during a stressful period. The 
earliest issuance date was November 25, 2008 and the latest insured bond maturity date 
is December 28, 2012, which is three days before the FDIC guarantee would have 
expired. Thus, the maximum maturity of the bonds was approximately four years. We use 
Mergent Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD) and the FDIC Temporary 
Liquidity Guarantee Program Archives to identify the DGP bond issuances by CUSIP 
number. 
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To eliminate erroneous entries in the TRACE data, the transactions are filtered 
according to the methods outlined by Dick-Nielsen (2009). The data are then processed 
further using a 10% median filter as described in Friewald, Jankowitsch, and 
Subrahmanyam (2012). Following Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009), daily 
yields are obtained by weighting individual trade prices by volume and finding the yield 
from the weighted-average price. We eliminate observations with yields less than 0 and 
greater than 100 to remove erroneous entries. The insured bonds do not contain any 
embedded calls, puts, or convertibility options; and to preserve comparability we limit 
the sample of non-insured bonds only to those without these embedded options. 
We use TRACE for trade-level data, Mergent FISD for bond-level data, and 
COMPUSTAT for firm-level data. We collect a daily midpoint (average of bid and ask 
prices) of the 5 year CDS spreads from Datastream. We also use VIX data from the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), the Baa-Aaa spread and US Treasury yields 
from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Electronic Database (FRED), as well as hand collect 
the earliest public confirmation of DGP participation for each firm from Factiva, 
Bloomberg, and other various news sources.37 Treasury yields for all maturities are 
linearly interpolated from the FRED data. 
We construct several variables from the data. First, we construct the Rating 
variable which increases with firm default risk. AAA rated firms are assigned a value of 
zero, AA+ firms are assigned a value of 1, AA firms a value of 2, and so on with each 
downward step increasing the variable by one unit. We also construct Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 
by estimating the bid-ask spread using the methodology of Hong and Warga (2000); that 
                                                 
37 If we are unable to find any public confirmation of DGP participation then we assume that the issuance 
date of the first guaranteed bond is the first public knowledge that a firm is positively a DGP participant. 
79 
is, we subtract the average sell price from the average buy price and divide by the mid-
point for each bond-day, and then take the natural logarithm. We use the natural logarithm 
to deal with the skewed nature of bid-ask spreads, as well as improve interpretability of 
the regression coefficients. Similarly, we also define Ln(Issue Size) and Ln(Firm size) as 
the natural log of issue size and firm assets scaled by one million dollars. Finally, we 
construct Post Announcement as a binary variable. For DGP-participating firms, this 
equals 1 for observations after the firm announces its DGP participation, and 0 prior to 
the announcement date. For nonparticipants, this variable equals 1 after October 20, 2008 
(the earliest DGP participation announcement) and 0 before. 
Table 23, Panels A and B, provides daily descriptive statistics for the bonds from 
October 1, 2008 through October 31, 2009. Panel A displays statistics for the full sample, 
while Panel B is limited to only guaranteed bonds. We see 27 percent of the bond-days 
in the sample are issued by firms participating in the DGP. The credit ratings of the 
issuing firms ranged from AAA to CC. It is important to note that while all guaranteed 
bonds were rated AAA, we use the credit rating of the issuing firm rather than the bond 
itself, so we can conduct ceteris paribus analysis when comparing guaranteed and non-
guaranteed bonds of the same firm. Standard & Poor’s debt ratings were acquired at a 
firm level from COMPUSTAT. 
[Insert Table 23 about here] 
For firm-level regressions, several bond-level variables need aggregated to the 
firm level. We do this based on trading volume. We calculated the percent of bond volume 
guaranteed under the DGP (% Gntd. Volume) by dividing the trading volume of a firm’s 
bonds guaranteed under the DGP by the total trading volume of the firm’s bonds. We 
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calculate the daily log of the bid-ask spread by taking the natural log of the volume-
weighted average of a firm’s bonds’ bid-ask spreads. Finally, we calculate the standard 
deviation of the bid-ask spread – to proxy for liquidity risk and rollover risk – as the 
rolling 5-day standard deviation of the volume-weighted average of a firm’s bonds’ bid-
ask spreads, following Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter, and Lando (2012). 
 
V. Empirical Findings 
Government guarantees allow firms to rollover their maturing debt and potentially 
create additional demand and liquidity in the market for their bonds. A debt guarantee 
from a credit-worthy government may well turn the table on a flight-to-quality episode, 
as it improves the credit quality of any debt issue to that of the guaranteeing entity. 
We first test whether government guarantees actually increased the liquidity of 
debt issuances. This should be the case in a flight-to-quality episode, as the guarantee 
increases the safety of debt, and likely increases the demand for that security in a market 
when investors flock to safe assets. In this context, we estimate the difference in liquidity 
of guaranteed and non-guaranteed bonds. 
To do this, we regress the natural logarithm of the bid-ask spread on a dummy 
variable indicating whether a bond is guaranteed, as well as, control variables that affect 
bid-ask spreads as given by Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003). For this regression, the 
sample includes only bonds (both guaranteed and non-guaranteed) issued by DGP-
participating firms. We also limit the sample to observations after the firm has announced 
their participation in DGP. This results in 26,267 bond-day observations from 1,966 
bonds. 
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As shown in Model 1 of Table 24, if a bond is guaranteed, the natural logarithm 
of the bid-ask spread is 1.824 units lower, which means that government guaranteed 
bonds have 83.86 percent38 smaller bid-ask spreads than their non-guaranteed 
counterparts. While a certain level of liquidity improvement was expected, this result 
indicates a vast difference in liquidity due to the government guarantees which is 
supportive of Hypothesis 1. 
[Insert Table 24 about here] 
We further inspect the effect of the government guarantee by interacting the 
guarantee dummy variable with several variables of interest: maturity, credit rating, issue 
size, and firm size in Table 24. From these interactions, displayed in Model 6 in Table 
24, we find that while bid-ask spreads are typically larger for longer-maturity bonds 
(6.7% increase in bid-ask spread for each year of maturity), this effect is magnified in 
guaranteed bonds (33.4% increase in bid-ask spread for each year of maturity).39 This 
differential in slopes is primarily due to the different scales of guaranteed bonds’ bid-ask 
spreads and non-guaranteed bonds’ bid-ask spreads. Specifically, a 33.4% increase in the 
minuscule bid-ask spreads of guaranteed bonds is actually comparable in dollar terms to 
a 6.7% increase in the larger bid-ask spreads of non-guaranteed bonds. Larger firms' 
guaranteed bonds also received a larger boost to liquidity. While firm size had no 
significant effect on bid-ask spreads of non-guaranteed bonds, we find that a 1% increase 
in firm size results in a 0.157% decrease in bid-ask spreads of guaranteed bonds.40 This 
                                                 
38 Exp(-1.824) - 1 = -0.8386. Of course, this computation can be repeated for the interpretation of every 
coefficient from a regression with a dependent variable in log form (Tables 3, 6, and 7). 
39 Exp(0.065) - 1 = 0.067 for non-insured. For insured, the Maturity and Guarantee*Maturity are 
coefficients are summed such that exp(0.065+0.223) -1 = 0.334. 
40 Since both the explanatory and outcome variables are in log form, we can interpret these coefficients as 
elasticities. 
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suggests that investors not only sought the safety of the government guarantee, but the 
guaranteed bonds of larger banks over those of smaller banks. Surprisingly, the increase 
in liquidity from a guarantee does not significantly vary by rating or issue size. 
Next, we investigate how government guarantees affect bond pricing by 
regressing the credit spread on a guaranteed bond dummy, interactions with critical 
variables, and a set of control variables. In addition to examining the effects of debt 
guarantees on credit spreads, we also estimate an equation where the total cost of debt 
issuance – in place of credit spread – is considered; specifically, the dependent variable 
is changed to be the credit spread plus insurance premium. The results for both 
estimations are in Table 25. To measure bond yield, we exclude floating rate bonds. To 
ensure accuracy of the TRACE data, we limit our data to yields between 0 and 100 
percent. We also limit our observations to those between October 1, 2008 and October 
31, 2009 - approximately the issuance window of DGP bonds. There are two samples: 
one using all bond-day observations, from all credit qualities, and another using only 
bond-day observations of bonds issued by financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 
6999). The first sample, analyzed in the odd numbered columns of Table 25, consists of 
187,092 bond-day observations from 8,600 bonds. The second sample, analyzed in the 
even columns of Table 25, consists of 57,902 observations from 3,473 bonds. 
In Model 1 of Table 25, we observe guaranteed bonds have yields which are 
4.347% lower than their non-guaranteed counterparts (3.287% after accounting for the 
insurance premium paid to the FDIC). When we limit the sample to bonds of financial 
firms, we find that yields of guaranteed bonds were actually 6.486% lower (5.451% after 
accounting for the insurance premium). The greater difference for financial firms may be 
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due to the heightened uncertainty and turmoil in the financial sector during the sample 
period. 
Subsequently, we examine evidence pertaining to Hypothesis 2, which suggests 
riskier firms receive a larger credit spread reduction from the government guarantee. To 
do this we analyze the interaction of the guarantee dummy and credit rating in Models 3, 
4, 7, and 8 of Table 25. Accordingly, we find riskier firms (a larger Rating variable) 
receive a larger credit spread reduction. This stands to reason in the case of the DGP, as 
no differential insurance premium for firm risk was charged by the FDIC. In particular, 
we find that a government guarantee lowers cost of debt by 126 basis points for each 
additional rating downgrade in Model 4. This offers evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2, 
and suggests policymakers acted in accordance with financial accelerator concerns in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Similarly, benefits were greater during times of 
heightened market uncertainty. In particular, for a one point increase in the VIX, a 
government guarantee reduced the credit spread by 12.2 basis points in Model 4, 
consistent with Hypothesis 3, and lending further credence that policymakers were 
concerned with financial accelerator effects. 
[Insert Table 25 about here] 
Table 25 illustrates a negatively-sloped convex credit spread term structure for 
non-insured bonds. This favors Krishnan et al. (2006). Next, we consider the CSTS of 
guaranteed bonds where we incorporate the regression coefficient on the interaction of 
maturity and the guaranteed dummy; we find the slope of the credit spread for guaranteed 
issuances is not statistically significant.41 
                                                 
41 The slope of the credit spread for guaranteed issuances is estimated as the sum of the given Maturity 
and Guaranteed*Maturity coefficients. The t-stat for this sum is not significant for Models 3, 4, 7 and 8. 
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While using a discrete cardinal ratings variable makes interpretation of regression 
coefficients very simple, credit spreads may not have a linear relationship with issuer 
credit ratings. As a robustness test, we recreate Model 3 of Table 25 using ratings fixed 
effects (therefore without the Rating and Junk variables) as well as an interaction of the 
Guaranteed dummy variable and the ratings fixed effects. The value of these fixed 
effects, as well as the value of the interaction coefficients are plotted in Figure 3. The 
slopes of the plotted lines suggest that the cardinal Rating variable and the Junk dummy 
variable do a good job of capturing the effect of credit rating on credit spreads. More 
importantly, we find that the regression coefficients on the other variables are 
qualitatively similar to those in Model 3 of Table 25. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
In order to test Hypothesis 4, we split the sample into two default risk-based 
groups: high-rated firms (with a Standard & Poor’s credit rating no lower than AA-), and 
low-rated firms (with a Standard & Poor’s credit rating of BBB+ or lower).42 The results 
for these regressions are presented in Table 26. 
When we examine Models 1 and 2 in Panel A of Table 26, we see that high-rated 
firms have insignificant coefficients for maturity and maturity squared; suggesting high-
rated firms faced a flat-sloped credit spread term structure without the guarantee. In 
Models 3 and 4, we see, in contrast, low-rated firms had a highly significant negative 
maturity coefficient and a similarly significant, but much smaller, coefficient for maturity 
squared. Thus, low-rated firms faced a negatively-sloped, convex CSTS without the 
guarantee. This is consistent with Hypothesis 4 suggesting shorter-term guaranteed debt 
                                                 
42 While we would prefer to use BB or lower, to align with speculative grade bonds, we extend the low 
rated group in order to have a meaningful sample size in the split-sample regressions. 
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of riskier firms received a greater credit spread reduction than longer-term debt. Upon 
analyzing the effect of the guarantee in Models 1 and 3, we find the slope of the CSTS 
increases more for low-rated firms (64.4 bps) than high-rated firms (12.1 bps). Note, the 
slope of the CSTS for guaranteed issuances is significantly positive only for high-rated 
firms (Model 2) when the dependent variable is the sum of the credit spread and the 
positively-sloped insurance premium in Models 2. This evidence suggests that during the 
2008 crisis, riskier bond issuances faced negatively-sloped CSTSs, while safer issuances 
faced relatively flat CSTSs. Collectively, the dissimilar shapes of CSTS for high versus 
low credit qualities supports Hypothesis 5. In regard to theories of credit spread term 
structure behavior during a crisis, this result suggests that the He and Xiong (2012) 
rollover effect is more supported than the Gorton et al. (2014) effect. 
In Panel B of Table 26, we further analyze the CSTS by splitting the sample into 
quartiles based on the level of the VIX on each bond-day observation. We use a similar 
procedure to that of Panel A, but rather than using high- and low-rated bonds as the 
samples, we use bond-day observations in which the VIX level was in the lower and upper 
quartile of Models 1 and 2, and Models 3 and 4, respectively. In this analysis, we see a 
similar phenomenon to that found in Panel A. That is, we find that when market 
conditions are less volatile, the CSTS of non-guaranteed bonds is less negatively sloped 
than when market conditions are more volatile, as evidenced by the different coefficients 
on Maturity (-0.242 in Model 1 versus -0.493 in Model 3). Interestingly, we see that the 
CSTS of guaranteed bonds is more positively sloped during more volatile market 
conditions than it is during less volatile conditions, as evidenced by much higher 
coefficients for the guaranteed and maturity interaction terms. In Model 1 (less volatile 
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markets), we find that the slope of guaranteed bonds is positive 11.3 bps per year of 
maturity while, in strong contrast, the slope of non-guaranteed bonds is negative 24.2 bps 
per year. Furthermore, in more volatile markets (Model 3) the slope of guaranteed bonds 
is positive 81.8 bps per year while the slope of non-guaranteed bonds is negative 49.3 bps 
per year. 
[Insert Table 26 about here] 
Corporate bonds with no default risk offer a unique opportunity to analyze the 
magnitudes and term structures of different parts of credit spreads. We use the estimated 
coefficients of maturity, maturity squared, and the interaction of guaranteed and maturity, 
(holding the other variables at their means) from the previous regressions to create visual 
representations of the credit spread, the non-default spread, and the default spread. The 
non-default spread provides a good estimate of the liquidity spread. Figure 4 uses the 
sample of bonds used in Tables 25 and 26. Panel A of Figure 4 is illustrative of the full 
sample from Table 25. The credit spread term structure estimated has a negative slope 
where, in contrast, the non-default spread is positive. The difference in the two spreads is 
the default spread which has a negative slope. We note that the default spread is much 
larger than the insurance premium charged. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
In Panels B and C of Figure 4, we split the sample into high- and low-rated firms 
by using the coefficients from regression Models 1 and 3 of Table 26. Interestingly, in 
Panel B we see high rated firms faced a flat CSTS, but a negatively-sloped default spread. 
The flat CSTS is a result of summing a relatively gentle negative sloping default spread 
summed with a positive sloping non-default term structure. For longer maturity issuances, 
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the default spread is nearly equal to the insurance premium charged by the FDIC, which 
would suggest that higher-rated firms may have had little economic incentive to issue 
longer maturity guaranteed bonds. In Panel C, for lower-rated firms, we see that both the 
CSTS and default spreads are clearly negatively sloped and of much greater magnitude 
than the DGP insurance premium structure. It is interesting to note that the default spread 
slope is negative but the non-default (liquidity) spread slope is positive. In conjunction, 
these results suggest weaker (lower-rated) firms received a much greater benefit than 
safer (higher-rated) firms from the positively-sloped insurance premium structure. 
Next, we test whether the government guarantee broadly translated into lower 
default risk for participating banks, as opposed to merely offering lower default risk for 
individual insured bonds. To answer this question, we perform a firm-level two-stage 
least squares (TSLS) analysis on the effects of DGP-induced liquidity on firms’ credit 
default swaps (CDS) spreads. This methodology allows us to measure the effect of 
liquidity on default risk by using DGP involvement as an exogenous shock to liquidity. 
It should be noted that DGP involvement is not a perfect instrument for liquidity because 
DGP involvement is an endogenous choice and possibly influenced by default risk. 
However, because DGP involvement substantially improves bond-level debt liquidity, as 
shown earlier, this research design permits us to examine the effects of DGP involvement 
on default risk through the liquidity channel. This valuable insight allows us to quantify 
the effect of a government debt guarantee on firm-level default risk. The results provide 
the first empirical evidence of the endogenous liquidity-default loop proposed by He and 
Xiong (2012) and He and Milbradt (2014). 
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In this analysis, we measure firm-level default risk as the midpoint of the bid and 
ask of the firm’s five year CDS spread, collected from Datastream. We measure liquidity 
two ways. First, as the log of the bid-ask spread of the bonds traded to measure the level 
of liquidity. Second, as the standard deviation of the bid-ask spread to measure the risk 
of liquidity, or alternatively, rollover risk – the risk of rolling over maturing debt at a 
higher cost due to an illiquid market. Clearly, both of these will be a function of default 
risk. Therefore we instrument for the liquidity measures using the percentage of the firm’s 
bond volume traded on a given day which is insured under the DGP (scaled from 0 to 1). 
More in-depth variable descriptions are provided in Appendix A. 
The results of the TSLS are provided in Table 27. We use a sample of firm-days 
between September 1, 2008 and December 31, 2008 to capture the peak of new DGP 
participation and minimize the noise in default risk arising from items outside of DGP 
involvement. We estimate separate models using the level of liquidity and the volatility 
of liquidity for all firms and for the sub-sample of financial firms (SIC code in the 6000s). 
In the first stage of the model, DGP involvement strongly decreases both the level and 
volatility of the bid-ask spread. If all of the firm’s traded bonds are guaranteed, then 
transaction costs decreased by 66.48% (62.47%) for all (financial) firms.43 Similarly, if 
all of the firm’s traded bonds are guaranteed, then liquidity risk – the standard deviation 
of the bid-ask spread – decreased by 32.4 (31.2) bps for all (financial) firms, from Models 
2A and 4A, respectively. 
In the second stage regressions, we observe the effects of the change in liquidity 
due solely to the DGP. Since the bid-ask spread and the credit default swap spread are 
                                                 
43 Exp(-1.093) - 1 = -0.6648; Exp(-0.980) - 1 = -0.6247; taken from models 1A and 3A. 
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both in log form, we can interpret those models directly as elasticities. Therefore, for a 
1% increase in bid-ask spreads, default risk increases by 0.841% (1.305%) for all 
(financial) firms. From earlier analysis, we know that guaranteed bonds had 83.86% 
smaller bid-ask spreads. Accordingly, if all of a firm’s traded bonds were guaranteed, 
firm-level default risk would be reduced by 70.53%. This was not the case, as only a very 
small fraction of a firm’s traded bonds were guaranteed. In fact, only 0.396% of firms’ 
daily bond volume was guaranteed on average (and still only 4.7% if we condition on the 
firm participating in the DGP). Taken in conjunction, this equates to an estimated 4.23% 
(5.84%) average reduction in default risk for a (financial) firm participating in DGP, or 
an 8.99 (12.41) basis point reduction in CDS spreads.44 Using the coefficients in the 
liquidity risk models (Models 2B and 4B), we estimate a reduction in default risk of 
5.27% (4.26%) when a (financial) firm participates in DGP. This evidence supports 
Hypothesis 5, that debt guarantees decrease default risk for the entire firm, not just the 
guaranteed debt issues. These findings provide empirical evidence consistent with the 
theory established by He and Xiong (2012) and He and Milbradt (2014), as the exogenous 
liquidity improvement provided by the insured bonds reduced debt rollover costs, and 
ultimately lowered default risk. 
[Insert Table 27 about here] 
We test the effect of debt guarantees on the liquidity of non-guaranteed bonds 
(Hypothesis 6) using a difference-in-differences approach to examine the effect of a DGP 
participation announcement on bid-ask spreads relative to the market. To do this, we 
regress the natural logarithm of bid-ask spreads on a binary variable indicating DGP 
                                                 
44 These figures are calculated using log linear properties of the regression coefficients and the mean 
212.49 basis point mean CDS spread. 
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participation, another binary indicating whether the observation was before or after the 
announcement of DGP participation45, and the interaction of the two indicator variables. 
We limit the sample to bond-day observations of non-guaranteed bonds between 
September 1, 2008 and December 31, 2008 in order to capture the high uncertainty during 
peak months of the financial crisis, but also limit the noise of bid-ask spreads arising from 
factors other than the DGP. The results of this test are presented in Table 28. 
As in previous regressions, we use two samples: one with all firms and one with 
only financial firms (SIC code in the 6000s). As shown in Model 1 of Table 28, prior to 
DGP announcement, bonds of DGP participants had 75% larger bid-ask spreads than 
nonparticipants. However, following announcement of participation, these firms’ bonds’ 
bid-ask spreads declined by 16%, consistent with Hypothesis 6. We use control variables 
in Models 3 and 4 and find that the DGP participants received a statistically significant 
11.3% reduction in their bid-ask spreads upon announcing their participation in the 
guarantee program (significant at the 1 and 10% levels in Models 3 and 4, respectively).46 
This offers conclusive evidence in favor of Hypothesis 6 – the liquidity of previously-
issued, non-guaranteed bonds of DGP participants improved relative to the market after 
the announcement of DGP participation. 
[Insert Table 28 about here] 
 
                                                 
45 If the issuing firm did not participate in DGP, then we use an event date of October 28, 2008 – the first 
confirmation of DGP participation.  
46 The coefficients accounting for the 75%, 16% and 11.3% differences in spread are 0.559, -0.177, and -
0.120, respectively. 
91 
VI. Conclusion  
Many economists share a negative opinion about the wisdom or effectiveness of 
government intervention into financial markets. We study a unique type of government 
intervention – government guaranteed bank bonds – which we show provides large 
benefits to bank bond issuers, existing bondholders, bank shareholders, the greater 
economy, and the guaranteeing agency itself. We analyze these guarantees using FDIC-
guaranteed debt under the Debt Guarantee Program (DGP). A primary purpose of a debt 
guarantee program is to reduce the risk of system failure and curtail financial crises. 
Specifically, we find guaranteed bonds are over 83% more liquid (in terms of bid-
ask spread) than their non-guaranteed counterparts. Also, the cost of debt for participating 
firms was reduced more for less liquid, riskier, and shorter-maturity issuances, suggesting 
policymakers acted in accordance with Bernanke et al. (1996) to assist riskier banks more 
than safe banks to prevent an exacerbation of credit risk in the financial sector. 
Importantly, the positively sloped term structure of premia charged was consistent with 
the idea that it is appropriate to have weaker banks enjoy greater benefits and prevent a 
financial accelerator effect. This is because weaker firms tend to have a negatively-sloped 
credit spread. Next, we find the default risk of the average DGP participating firm 
decreased by approximately 5%, consistent with the endogenous liquidity-default loop 
models of He and Xiong (2012) and He and Milbradt (2014). Finally, we find preexisting, 
non-guaranteed bonds increased in liquidity by more than 12% due to the government 
guarantee. These findings, along with the implications of the financial theory cited in this 
study, present a convincing case that the guarantee of bank debt may be a suitable 
instrument of government intervention.  
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Appendix A: Chapter 1 Variable Definitions 
This appendix lists all the variables used throughout Chapter 1 and Tables 1 through 9, provides 
their precise definitions, and explains their construction. Voluntary disclosures are hand 
collected via a Factiva guided search and the remaining principal data sources are Compustat, 
CRSP, I/B/E/S, RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC), Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum, 
and firms’ 10-K forms. 
 
Variable Definition 
AC 
Analyst Coverage. The number of financial analysts following the firm 
in a particular year. 
ATI 
The alternative takeover index defined by Cremers and Nair (2005). 
This index takes a value between 0 and 3 for each given firm by giving 
one point for each of the three components of the index that the firm 
has. The three provisions include: blank check preferred, staggered 
boards, and restrictions on calling special meetings or acting by written 
consent. 
BDIND 
The board independence indicator takes the value of 1 if more than 60% 
of the directors are classified as independent, and 0 otherwise. As in 
previous research, independent directors are classified as those who are 
not corporate executives and do not have a business relationship with 
the company. 
BDSIZE 
The total number of individuals that serve on the board of directors for 
a firm in a given year. 
DISC-Binary 
Voluntary disclosure measure that is binary nature. This variable takes 
a value of 1 if a particular firm provides a voluntary change in hedging 
announcement in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
DISC-Count 
Voluntary disclosure measure that is a count variable. This variable 
takes the value of the number of hedging voluntary disclosures that a 
firm provides the market in a particular year. 
DISC-Initial 
Voluntary disclosure measure that is binary nature. This variable takes 
a value of 1 if a particular firm provides its first voluntary change in 
hedging announcement in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
DISC-Ratio 
Voluntary disclosure measure that is a ratio variable. This measure is 
defined as the number of disclosures that a particular firm in a certain 
year provides the market, divided by the total number of disclosures for 
the entire oil and gas industry in the same year. 
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DISC-
Transparency 
Voluntary disclosure measure that is a measure of transparency. This 
variable is calculated as the number of disclosures that a firm in a given 
year provides the market, divided by the time series volatility of hedge 
ratio changes for that firm during the announcement sample period. If 
the firm does not make an announcement during time t, then the value 
is set to 0. 
DISP 
This variable is the analyst forecast dispersion in a particular year. It is 
measured as the standard deviation of one-year-ahead earnings per share 
(EPS) forecasts scaled by the absolute mean forecast; accordingly, I use 
the most recent consensus forecast before the end of year. 
E-Index 
The entrenchment index was created by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2009). The level of the entrenchment index for any given firm is 
calculated by giving one point for each of the six provisions related to 
the index that the firm has. The six provisions are: staggered board, 
limits to amend bylaws, limits to amend charter, supermajority, golden 
parachutes, and poison pill. 
G-Index 
The governance index was created by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003). The level of the governance index for any given firm is 
calculated by giving one point for each of the twenty four provisions 
related to the index that the firm possesses. The twenty four provisions 
are: Antigreen mail, blank check, business combination law, cash-out 
law, compensation plans, director duties, director indemnification, 
director indemnification contracts, director liability, fair price, golden 
parachutes, limits to amend bylaws, limits to amend charter, limits to 
special meeting, limits to written consent, no cumulative vote, no secret 
ballot, pension parachutes, poison pill, severance agreements, silver 
parachutes, staggered board, supermajority, and unequal vote. 
ΔHEDGER-Binary  
Indicator variable that the firm has changed its hedge ratio for the 
particular year. 
INST 
Indicator takes the value of 1 if institutional investors own more than 
66% of total number of common shares outstanding. The total 
percentage of the firm that is owned by institutional investors as 
reported by Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum database for a given 
year. 
Leverage 
Calculated as the book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of 
book values of preferred stock, common equity, and long-term debt. 
*The specific Compustat variables associated with the variable 
definition are as follows: book value of long-term debt is DLTT, book 
value of preferred stock is PSTK, and book value of common equity is 
CEQ.  
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MTB 
Market-to-book ratio is the book value of total assets, minus book value 
of common equity, plus market value of equity, divided by book value 
of total assets. *The specific Compustat variables associated with the 
variable definition are as follows: book value of total assets is AT, book 
value of common equity is CEQ, and the market value of equity is 
multiplication of CSHO and PRCC_F. 
QR 
Quick ratio for the firm is defined by the ratio: (cash + cash equivalents 
+ receivables) / current liabilities. *The specific Compustat variables 
associated with the variable definition are as follows: cash and cash 
equivalents is CHE, receivables is RECT, and current liabilities is LCT. 
ROA 
Return on assets for the firm. This variable is calculated as the ratio of 
net income to assets. *The specific Compustat variables associated with 
the variable definition are as follows: net income is NI and book value 
of total assets is AT. 
RVOL 
Equity return volatility for the firm. This variable is measured as the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns in a particular year.  
Size 
The natural logarithm of the market value of assets. The market value 
of assets equals book value of assets, minus book value of common 
stock, plus market value of equity. *The specific Compustat variables 
associated with the variable definition are as follows: net income is NI 
and book value of total assets is AT.  
TLCF 
Tax loss carry forwards for a firm. The measure takes a value of 1 if 
firm has tax loss carry forwards, zero otherwise. *The specific 
Compustat variable associated with the variable definition is as follows: 
Tax loss carry forwards is TLCF. 
TXFO 
Foreign tax credits for the firm. The measure takes the value of 1 if firm 
has foreign tax credits, zero otherwise. I use the amount of current 
foreign taxes payable as the measure of foreign tax credit. Following 
prior literature, I set missing value to zero. *The specific Compustat 
variable associated with the variable definition is as follows: foreign 
income taxes is TXFO. 
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Appendix B: Chapter 2 Variable Definitions 
This appendix lists all the variables used throughout Chapter 2 and Tables 10 through 21, 
provides their precise definitions, and explains their construction.  
 
Variable Definition 
AGE 
The age of the firm in years is measured as the number of years the 
firm is reported in the COMPUSTAT Fundamentals Annual – same 
year as observation. 
CAR 
The market adjusted value-weighted cumulative abnormal return for 
the window of -5 days to +5 days surrounding the dividend initiation 
announcement. 
Cash/TA 
Measure the cash and short-term securities of the firm. This variable 
is CHEQ (COMPUSTAT), which is the cash and short-term 
investments. It is then adjusted by the total assets of the firm (ATQ) 
EBITDA/TA 
Measured as the operating income before depreciation (OIBDPQ) and 
adjusted by the total assets of the firm (ATQ). 
High Institutional 
Holding 
Binary variable that takes the value of one if the firm is located within 
the highest quartile in terms of institutional holdings the year 
preceding the dividend initiation announcement, zero otherwise. 
Institutional 
Holdings 
Measured as the ratio of shares held by institutional investors relative 
to total shares outstanding in yearend reports for institutional holdings 
obtained from CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings database. 
Log (# of Dividend 
Firms) 
Measured as the log (number of dividend paying firms). This variable 
measures the number of dividend paying firm observations associated 
with each dividend initiation that is included in the final sample. 
Log(# of Firms) 
Measured as the log (number of firms). This variable requires that at 
least 10 firms per dividend initiation are included in the final sample. 
Log(Population) 
Measured as the log (population estimate), this population estimate is 
obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. This variable is observation 
specific for year and MSA. – same year as observation 
Low Institutional 
Holding 
Binary variable that takes the value of one if the firm is not located 
within the highest quartile in terms of institutional holdings the year 
preceding the dividend initiation announcement, zero otherwise. 
Payer 
Binary variable that takes the value of one if the firm within the 
sample is a dividend payer the quarter prior to the dividend 
announcement, zero otherwise. 
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Sales 
Measured as the log (1+SALEQ), where SALEQ is the 
COMPUSTAT variable for sales/turnover (net) and has been adjusted 
to 1990 dollars. 
Senior 
The percentage of the population of the MSA that is over the age of 
64, this variable was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. – same 
year as observation 
Senior Citizen 
Binary variable that takes the value of one if the firm is located within 
the highest quartile in terms of persons over 65 compared to the 
overall population of the MSA, zero otherwise. 
Size 
Measured as the log (1+ATQ), where ATQ is the COMPUSTAT 
variable for total assets and has been adjusted to 1990 dollars. 
State 
Unemployment 
Rate 
The state unemployment rate for the firm observation in the sample 
by year; obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics – same year 
as observation. 
Stock Return 
This is the firm's previous quarter returns as measured by the monthly 
CRSP file. 
Tobin’s Q 
Derived as (ATQ – CEQQ + absolute value 
(PRCCQ*CSHOQ))/ATQ. Where ATQ is the total assets of the firm, 
CEQQ is the total common/ordinary equity, PRCCQ is the closing 
price of the firm's stock at the end of the quarter, and CSHOQ is the 
firm's common shares outstanding. 
Top 20 City 
Binary variable that takes the value of one if the firm is located within 
one of the 20 most populous cities as measured by the U.S. Census 
Bureau from 1980-2011, resulting in a total of 25 different cities, zero 
otherwise. 
Total Debt/TA 
This variable captures both short and long-term debt of the firm. It is 
measured by adding debt in current liabilities (DLCQ) and long-term 
debt (DLTTQ); then it is adjusted by the total assets of the firm 
(ATQ). 
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Appendix C: Chapter 3 Variable Definitions 
This appendix lists all the variables used throughout Chapter 3 and Tables 22 through 28, 
provides their precise definitions, and explains their construction.  
 
Panel A: Bond-Level Variables 
Variable Definition 
Bond Age 
The bond age is calculated as the difference in the trade execution date 
from TRACE and the offering date from Mergent FISD, scaled by 365 
days. 
Coupon Rate 
The coupon rate is gathered from Mergent FISD for all fixed-coupon 
bonds, and assigned a 0 for all zero coupon bonds. This value is 
missing for all floating-rate bonds. 
Floating Dummy 
The Floating Dummy is a binary variable equal to 1 for variable rate 
bond issuances and 0 otherwise. 
Guaranteed 
Dummy 
The Guaranteed Dummy is a binary variable equal to 1 for a bond 
issuance guaranteed by the FDIC under the Debt Guarantee Program 
and 0 otherwise. 
Ln(Bid-Ask 
Spread) 
Following Hong and Warga (2000), the bid-ask spread is estimated 
using TRACE data each day, by finding the volume-weighted average 
buy price and sell price, and then finding the difference in the buy and 
sell prices, scaled by the mid-point of the two prices. The bid-ask 
spreads are then winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We then 
take the natural log of the estimated bid-ask spread. 
Ln(Issue Size) 
Ln(Issue Size) is the natural log of the size of the bond issue (defined 
as the sum of the offering amount and action amount per Mergent 
FISD) scaled by $1 million. 
Maturity 
The maturity is defined as the maturity date (from Mergent FISD) 
minus the trade execution date (from TRACE), scaled by 365. 
Maturity2 The square of Maturity. 
Premium 
Premium is the insurance premium the issuing firm paid to the FDIC 
in exchange for the guarantee. This is calculated according to Table 
1. 
Price 
The daily price of the bond is calculated as the volume weighted 
average of the bond price from trades over the day, following 
Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009). 
Total Cost 
The total cost of debt issuance is calculated as the sum of the yield 
spread and the insurance premium. 
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Yield 
The yield is calculated for each bond-day observation of fixed- or 
zero-coupon bonds using the interest frequency, coupon, and maturity 
from Mergent FISD, the settlement date (three business days after the 
trade date) and the weighted average daily bond price gathered from 
TRACE. The decimal yield is finally multiplied by 100. 
Yield Spread 
The yield spread is calculated as the difference in the yield of a bond 
and the interpolated treasury yield, based on maturity. 
 
Panel B: Firm-Level Variables 
% Guaranteed 
Volume 
The percent of the firm’s bond volume trading on a given day is 
guaranteed under the Debt Guarantee Program. 
DGP Firm Dummy 
The DGP Firm dummy is a binary variable equal to 1 if the issuing 
parent firm is a DGP-participating firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Leverage 
Leverage of the issuing firm is calculated from COMPUSTAT as the 
sum of total current liabilities (DLC) and total long term liabilities 
(DLTT), scaled by total assets (AT). 
Ln(Bid-Ask 
Spread) 
The natural log of the volume-weighted bid-ask spread of each of the 
firm’s bonds traded on a given day. 
Ln(CDS) 
The natural log of the mid-quote (average of bid and ask) spread of 
the firm’s 5 year credit default swap, collected from Datastream. 
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Appendix D: Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Oil and Gas Prices with the Yearly Distribution of  
Hedging Announcement 
 
The figure in Panel A (B) below shows the yearly distribution of oil specific voluntary disclosures 
related to corporate hedging decreases (increases) by oil and gas firms (SIC Code = 1311) and 
the average oil price between January 1990 and January 2013. The figure in Panel C (D) below 
shows the yearly distribution of natural gas specific voluntary disclosures related to corporate 
hedging decreases (increases) by oil and gas firms (SIC Code = 1311) and the average natural gas 
price between January 1990 and January 2013. 
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Table 1: Announcement Event Descriptive and Event Characteristics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the announcement and event characteristics for 
corporate hedging announcement by oil and gas firms (SIC Code = 1311) between January 1991 
and January 2013. Panel A displays the announcements identified as Contemporaneous (Non-
Contemporaneous) when there are other (no other) firm-specific news items between disclosure 
days -1 and +1. Panel B represents the reason identified for the change in hedging policy for the 
announcement. A disclosure is categorized as Market View when the firm making the hedging-
related announcement explicitly claims that the change in hedging policy is a result of its 
expectations about future oil and/or gas prices. Announcements are identified as a Bank Loan 
observation when the change in hedging policy is a consequence of a loan-related transaction. 
Any remaining observations are recognized as Other observations for the reason for change in 
hedging policy. Panel C shows the timing of the change in hedging policy relative to the time of 
the announcement for the announcements. Disclosures are categorized as Ex ante (Ex post) when 
the change in hedging policy is announced in advance of (subsequent to) its implementation. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics, Chapter 1 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the oil and gas firms (SIC Code =1311) between January 
1991 and January 2013 used in the analysis. G-Index is the governance index from Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003), E-Index is the entrenchment index from Bebchuck, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2009), and ATI is the alternative takeover provision index from Cremers and Nair (2005). AC is 
the measure of the level of analyst coverage, BDIND is a measure of board independence, BDSIZE 
is a measure of the board size, and DISP is the analyst forecast dispersion for the respective firms. 
MTB is the market-to-book ratio, QR is the firm’s quick ratio, ROA is the firm’s return on assets, 
RVOL is the firm’s stock return volatility, TLCF is defined as the tax loss carry forward, and 
TXFO is a proxy for foreign tax credits. Panel A reports descriptive statistics of selected variables 
used throughout. Panel B contains summary statistics for the three sub-groups identified in the 
oil and gas industry: (1) firms that do not hedge and therefore do not disclose changes in hedging 
policy, (2) firms that hedge and do NOT disclose changes in hedging policy, and (3) firms that 
hedge and disclose changes in hedging policy. The notation ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, in the differences in means and medians 
of the variables between the three sub-samples using the t-test for means and Wilcoxon signed 
rank-sum test for medians. The variables in the table are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 8: Delta E-Index Regressions 
 
This table contains the results of change regression specifications. The dependent variables are 
the change in the respective index between years. G-Index is the governance index from Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003). E-Index is the governance index from Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2009). ATI is the alternative takeover provision index from Cremers and Cohen (2005). MTB is 
the market-to-book ratio, ROA is the firm’s return on assets, and Size is the size of the firm. 
HEDGER-Binary is an indicator variable that the firm has a hedge ratio for the particular year. 
All results presented are reflective of the OLS regression specifications with clustered standard 
errors and firm and year dummies. T-statistics are presented in brackets below the respective 
coefficients. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. The variables in the table are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
127 
Table 9: Second-Stage Heckman E-Index Provision Regressions 
 
This table contains the results of regression specifications conducted to analyze the relation 
between the specific provisions of the E-Index (staggered board, limits to amend bylaws, limits 
to amend charter, supermajority, golden parachutes, and poison pill) and various measures of 
voluntary disclosures made by oil and gas mining firms (SIC Code = 1311) between January 1991 
and January 2013. All results presented are reflective of the second stage of the Heckman (1979) 
two-step selection model. The other regressions are not provided for brevity, but are available 
upon request. Column 1 is a logit regression specification with the DISC-Binary measure as the 
dependent variable. Column 3 is the Poisson regression specification with the DISC-Count 
variable as the dependent variable. Column 5 exhibits the GLM fractional logit regression 
specification appropriate for the DISC-Ratio variable as the dependent variable. Column 7 reports 
the Tobit regression specification with a lower limit of 0 for the dependent variable of DISC-
Transparency. Control variables include: AC is the measure of the level of analyst coverage, 
BDIND is a measure of board independence, BDSIZE is a measure of the board size, DISP is the 
analyst forecast dispersion for the respective firms, MTB is the market-to-book ratio, ROA is the 
firm’s return on assets, RVOL is the firm’s stock return volatility, and Size is the size of the firm. 
The standard errors are clustered and the t-statistics are presented in brackets below the respective 
coefficients. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. The variables in the table are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics, Chapter 2 
 
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in the analysis throughout the article using 
the dividend initiation data for all other firms located in an MSA as the announcement. The time 
period for the sample is 1980 to 2011 and results in a total of 748 dividend initiations after the 
data screens. The variables in the table are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 11: Univariate Statistics by Senior Citizen Population Quartiles 
 
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in the analysis throughout the article using 
the dividend initiation data for all other firms located in an MSA as the announcement. The time 
period for the sample is 1980 to 2011 and results in a total of 748 dividend initiations after the 
data screens. The variables in the table are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 11 (continued) 
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Table 14: Mean Regression Analysis 
 
This table provides the regression analysis of the data by announcement mean and MSA mean 
with the dependent variable being CAR. Below are the results for announcement mean regressions 
on the entire sample (Column 1), dividend paying firms in the sample (Column 2) and non-paying 
dividend firms within the sample (Column 3). As there were 748 total dividend initiation 
announcement identified, there is a maximum of 748 observations. Also, below are the results for 
the MSA mean regression for the entire sample (Column 4), dividend paying firms within the 
data (Column 5) and non-paying dividend firms within the sample (Column 6). As there were 
only observations from 26 MSAs after data screens there are only 26 observations for this 
analysis. These regressions are representative of the time period from 1980 to 2011. The reported 
standard errors for announcement mean regressions are clustered by MSA and the standard errors 
for the MSA mean regressions are adjusted to the specification consistent with White’s robust 
standard errors. The constant term was included in the model but excluded from this table for 
brevity. The constant terms are omitted for brevity. P-values are reported in the parentheses 
underneath the coefficient estimates. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. The variables in the table are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 19: Probit Regression Analysis including Fixed Effects 
Dividend Paying Sub-Sample 
 
This table provides the probit regression analysis of the dividend paying sample with the 
dependent variable being a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm increased dividend 
payouts with the year following the dividend initiation. These regressions are representative of 
the time period from 1980 to 2011. The standard errors are clustered by MSA. P-values are 
reported in the parentheses underneath the coefficient estimates. ***, ** and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The variables in the table are defined in 
Appendix B. 
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Table 20: Change in ROA Fixed Effects Regression Analysis 
Dividend Paying Sub-Sample 
 
This table provides the regression analysis for the dividend paying sample where the dependent 
variable is the change in industry mean adjusted EBITDA/TA in the fiscal year of the dividend 
initiation from the industry mean adjusted EBITDA/TA of the previous year. These regressions 
are representative of the time period from 1980 to 2011. The standard errors are clustered by 
MSA. P-values are reported in the parentheses underneath the coefficient estimates. ***, ** and 
* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The variables in 
the table are defined in Appendix B. 
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Figure 2: Theoretical Bank Term Structures 
 
This figure illustrates the contrasting shapes of the CSTS theorized by various authors dependent 
upon credit quality of the firm, underlying parameters, and economic conditions. Merton (1974) 
and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) are two of the most cited theoretical papers and their 
qualitative results are partially reported below. Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2006) provide 
empirical analysis of bank credit spreads where, on average, they had a negative slope. We also 
provide a hypothetical positively-sloped insurance premium in a step function. 
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Figure 3: Credit Spread by Issuer Credit Rating 
 
This figure displays the ratings fixed effects from the regression which emulates Model 3 from 
Table 25, replacing the constructed Rating and Junk variables with issuer credit rating fixed 
effects. The fixed effects are also interacted with the Guaranteed dummy variable. The values of 
the fixed effects are plotted with the solid line, while the fixed effects interacted with the 
guaranteed dummy are plotted with a dotted line. The remaining coefficients in the regression 
(untabulated) are qualitatively similar to those reported in Model 3 of Table 25. 
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Figure 4: Maturity Impact on Credit Spread 
 
These figures show the variation in credit spreads for the non-guaranteed and guaranteed bonds 
dependent upon maturity. Panel A is reflective of the full sample of bonds reported in Table 25 
using Model 4 regression coefficients. The bond term structure modeled in Panel A is assumed 
to be investment grade. Panel B is reflective of the high credit rating sub-sample of bonds reported 
in Table 26 using Model 1. Panel C is reflective of the low credit rating sub-sample of bonds 
reported in Table 26 using Model 3. All bond estimates are reflective of the other variables taken 
at their mean for the appropriate sample and multiplied by the respective coefficients. 
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Figure 4 (continued) 
 
 
  
151 
Table 22: FDIC Debt Guarantee Program Fees 
 
This table provides the premiums charged by the FDIC for bonds issued under the Debt Guarantee 
Program. Panel A is representative of the fees charged based on the maturity of the issue. These 
rates increased by 10 basis points for senior unsecured debt issued by an entity that is not an 
insured depository institution if, as of September 30, 2008, the combined assets of all insured 
depository institutions affiliated with such entity constitute less than 50% of consolidated holding 
company assets. Panel B reports the additional premiums charged by the FDIC to those listed in 
Panel A for bonds issued under the Debt Guarantee Program after April 1, 2009. 
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Table 23: Descriptive Statistics, Chapter 3 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for Chapter 3 over the entire sample (Panel A) and 
guaranteed bonds only (Panel B). Observations are on a bond-day basis. All variables are defined 
in Appendix C. 
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Table 24: Effect of Government Guarantee on Bid-Ask Spreads 
 
This table displays results for the multivariate analysis testing the improvement of liquidity for 
guaranteed bonds. Guaranteed Dummy equals 1 if the bond issuance is guaranteed and 0 
otherwise. This variable is then interacted with other variables to analyze the effect of the 
guarantee on the determinants of bond liquidity. Control variables concerning the determinants 
of bid-ask spreads follow Chakravarty, and Sarkar (2003) and are defined in Appendix C. The 
sample for this unbalanced panel regression consists of bonds issued by DGP participants trading 
within 180 days of the first confirmation of DGP participation. Standard errors are clustered by 
bond and date. T-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 25: Effect of Government Guarantee on Credit Spreads 
 
This table displays results for the multivariate analysis of the cost of debt (credit spread) reduction 
for guaranteed bonds. The sample for this unbalanced panel regression consists of bond-day 
observations between Oct. 1, 2008 and Oct. 31, 2009. Standard errors are clustered by bond and 
date. T-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
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Table 26: Effect of Government Guarantee on CSTS by Rating and VIX 
 
This table displays results for the multivariate analysis of credit spreads for guaranteed bonds. 
The sample for this unbalanced panel regression consists of bond-day observations between Oct. 
1, 2008 and Oct. 31, 2009. Standard errors are clustered by bond and date. The regressions in 
Panel A uses a subsample of bonds rated higher than A and a separate subsample of bonds rated 
lower than A. Panel B uses two subsamples of observations – those in the top quartile of VIX 
levels and those in the bottom quartile. T-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix C. 
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Table 26 (continued) 
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Table 28: Effect of DGP Participation Announcement 
on Non-guaranteed Bond Liquidity 
 
This table presents a difference-in-differences analysis of the effect of DGP participation 
announcements on bid-ask spreads of non-guaranteed bonds. Control variables concerning the 
determinants of bid-ask spreads follow Chakravarty, and Sarkar (2003). All variables are defined 
in Appendix C. The sample for these regressions consists of bond-day observations between Sept. 
1, 2008 and Dec. 31, 2008. The standard errors are clustered by bond and date. T-statistics are in 
parenthesis. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
 
 
 
 
